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THOU SHALT REASONABLY FOCUS ON ITS 
CONTEXT:  ANALYZING PUBLIC DISPLAYS 
OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Judge Roy S. Moore, former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme 
Court, brought public displays of the Ten Commandments into the 
headlines during the summer of 2003 when he refused to obey a federal 
judge’s order to remove a two-ton granite monument displaying the Ten 
Commandments from the rotunda of the Alabama Judicial Building.1  
His refusal to remove the monument instigated a spirited quest by many 
to allow the monument to remain in the rotunda.2   
Although Judge Moore brought the issue of public Ten 
Commandments displays into the public arena, it was not an unfamiliar 
issue to the courts.3  Beginning in 1973, citizens of various cities began 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Arian Campo-Flores, Roy Moore’s Holy War; The ‘Ten Commandments Judge’ 
Always Loves a Fight, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 2003, at 38, available at 2002 WL 8639747.  In 2001, 
Judge Moore had placed this monument in the rotunda during the middle of the night.  
Kyle Wingfield, Ten Commandments; Alabama Justice Loses His Job, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 
14, 2002, at A01, available at 2003 WL 67799072.  On November 13, 2003, a judicial ethics 
panel removed Judge Moore from the Alabama Supreme Court for his refusal to remove 
the monument from the rotunda.  Id.  Judge Moore had previously gained attention for a 
Ten Commandments display when a 1994 lawsuit was filed against him as a circuit court 
judge to remove the Ten Commandments from his courtroom.  Campo-Flores, supra, at 38. 
2 See, e.g., Melissa Mullins, Ten Commandments Caravan Headed for Washington, 
CYBERCAST NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 29, 2003, at http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/archive/ 
200309/CUL20030929c.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2004) (describing the five state “Save the 
Commandments Caravan” Tour, which ended at the Supreme Court in October 2003 
asking the Supreme Court to hear Judge Moore’s case and to declare the Ten 
Commandments the moral foundation of the U.S. Constitution).  Politicians also sought to 
keep Judge Moore’s monument available to the public.  See Alabama Declines Offer to House 
Monument, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 5, 2003, at 5B, available at 2003 WL 4884320 
(reporting that Governor Ronnie Musgrave of Mississippi offered to display Judge Moore’s 
monument for a week in Mississippi and that he would encourage other governors to 
display the monument); Erin Stephenson, Religion Can’t Be Mandate, FORT COLLINS 
COLORADOAN, Sept. 1, 2003, at B1, available at 2003 WL 57879422 (reporting that former 
presidential candidate Alan Keyes led protests defying the federal judge’s orders to remove 
the monument). 
3 See infra text accompanying note 5.  In addition to Ten Commandments displays at 
courthouses, courts have considered the constitutionality of Ten Commandments displays 
at public schools.  This Note will not address Ten Commandments displays in public 
schools.  For cases regarding this issue, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Baker v. 
Adams County, 310 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2002); DiLoreto v. Downy Unified School District Board of 
Education, 196 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Harlan County School District, 96 F. Supp. 2d 
667 (E.D. Ky. 2000).  For statutes authorizing displays of Ten Commandments in schools, 
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challenging the constitutionality of Ten Commandments monuments 
donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.4  Twenty years later, when the 
Eleventh Circuit ruled on Judge Moore’s monument, five federal courts 
of appeals, various federal district courts, and one state supreme court 
had issued holdings on public Ten Commandments displays.5   
In analyzing Ten Commandments displays, courts have employed 
the Endorsement Test, a modification of the Lemon Test, which focuses 
on the perceptions of a reasonable observer.6  However, courts have not 
always used a uniform reasonable observer standard.  The reasonable 
observer may be informed:  a reasonable observer in the Third Circuit 
knows the approximate age of a Ten Commandments plaque;7 and a 
reasonable observer in the Eleventh Circuit knows that Judge Moore 
campaigned under the slogan “Ten Commandments Judge.”8  The 
reasonable observer may be an uninformed passerby:  a reasonable 
observer in the Sixth Circuit is unable to identify a unifying theme 
between the Ten Commandments, the Magna Carta, the Mayflower 
Compact, and other historical documents;9 and a reasonable observer in 
the Seventh Circuit concludes endorsement after viewing the Ten 
Commandments without first looking at the other documents in the 
display.10  The result of applying different standards of the reasonable 
                                                                                                             
see N.C. GEN. ST. § 115C-81 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-06-17.1 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 13-24-17.1 (Michie 2002).  For law review articles discussing Ten Commandments 
displays in schools, see Tarik Abdel-Monem, Note, Posting the Ten Commandments as a 
Historical Document in Public Schools, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1023 (2002); Robert G. Hensley, Jr., 
Comment, Written in Stone:  Why Renewed Attempts to Post the Ten Commandments in Public 
Schools Will Likely Fail, 81 N.C. L. REV. 801 (2003). 
4 See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text. 
5 The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits had issued rulings on public 
Ten Commandments displays prior to Judge Moore’s case.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 112-14, 119-24, 133-40, and 146-56.  The Fifth and Sixth Circuits ruled on Ten 
Commandments displays in the months following the Moore case.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 138-43 and 157-63.  The Eighth Circuit also ruled on a Ten 
Commandments monument following the Moore case, but the decision was vacated.  See 
ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated by No. 02-2444, 2004 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 6636 (8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004).  The Colorado Supreme Court ruled on a public 
Ten Commandments display.  See infra note 119.  See infra notes 142 and 161 for district 
courts that have issued holdings on Ten Commandments displays. 
6 See infra Part III.C.  
7 See infra text accompanying note 135. 
8 See infra text accompanying note 140. 
9 See infra text accompanying note 161. 
10 See infra text accompanying note 156. 
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observer is that courts issue inconsistent holdings regarding public Ten 
Commandments displays.11 
Because the number of challenges to public Ten Commandments 
displays continues to grow12 and because politicians are seeking to enact 
laws allowing the Ten Commandments to be posted on government 
property,13 courts need a method to analyze Ten Commandments 
                                                 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 168-70. 
12 Mary Jacoby, The Teen, an Alderman, and Ten Commandments, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Aug. 17, 2003, at 1A, available at 2003 WL 56464320 (stating that in the 1990s there was only 
one significant ruling on the Ten Commandments, but that federal courts have ruled on 
Ten Commandments displays seventeen times since 2000); see also Warren Richey, Ten 
Commandments Challenges Spread; Disputes Have Arisen in 14 States; Many Rulings Go Against 
the Displays, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 4, 2003, at 01, available at 2003 WL 5254701 
(reporting that at the beginning of August 2002, disputes concerning Ten Commandments 
displays were underway in Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin).  Within a 
nine-day period in September of 2003, two new lawsuits were filed against local 
government entities for Ten Commandments displays.  See ACLU Sues Barrow County Over 
Court’s Commandments, AUGUSTA CHRON., Sept. 17, 2003, at B06, available at 2003 WL 
63410456 (reporting that on September 16, 2003, the ACLU filed suit against Barrow 
County, Georgia for its display of the Ten Commandments at the county courthouse); 
Separationists Sue Over Pl. Grove Tablet, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Sept. 26, 2003, at B02, 
available at 2003 WL 64082380 (reporting that the Society of Separationists filed suit against 
the City of Pleasant Grove, Utah on September 25, 2003, for its display of the Ten 
Commandments in the local city park). 
13 On October 21, 2003, Representative Cliff Stearns of Florida introduced a bill in the 
United States House of Representatives proposing that the Architect of the Capital place a 
copy of the Ten Commandments in the United States Capital Building.  H.R. Con. Res. 310, 
108th Cong. (2003), http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c108query.html.  On May 9, 2003, 
Representative Robert Aderholt of Alabama, along with 102 other Representatives, 
introduced the “Ten Commandments Defense Act of 2003.”  H.R. 2045, 108th Cong. (2003), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c108query.html.  This Act would reserve all power to 
display the Ten Commandments on government property to each of the States.  Id.  
Although this bill was introduced before the controversy surrounding Judge Moore, Rep. 
Aderholt has used the public outcry to tout his bill.  See Press Release, Americans United 
for Separation of Church and State, Alabama Lawmaker Promotes Unconstitutional ‘Ten 
Commandments Defense Act,’ (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr= 
pr&page=NewsArticle&id=5057&security=1002&news_iv_ctrl=1346 (last visited Aug. 19, 
2004).  Cf. Associated Press, God Declared ‘Foundation of Our National Heritage,’ LEXINGTON 
HERALD LEADER, Oct. 24, 2003, at B4, available at 2003 WL 65040794 (reporting that several 
Tennessee counties have passed a resolution recognizing “God as the foundation of our 
national heritage,” and that several counties have also passed resolutions approving the 
posting of the Ten Commandments in government buildings); Laura A. Bischoff, Ten 
Commandments Debate May Arise, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 8, 2003, at B1, available at 2003 
WL 68275820 (reporting that an Ohio State Representative is sponsoring a resolution that 
would declare the Ten Commandments the “moral underpinning” of government). 
 The State of Indiana has already enacted a law authorizing the Ten Commandments 
to be publicly displayed.  See IND. CODE ANN. § 4-20.5-21-2 (West 2002).  This statute 
permits the Ten Commandments to be displayed on any property owned by the state when 
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displays that will provide consistent results.  This Note will address the 
constitutionality of public displays of the Ten Commandments under the 
Establishment Clause and will propose a new test that focuses on the 
type of the Ten Commandments displays.  First, this Note will discuss 
the present constitutional framework for analyzing challenges to the 
Establishment Clause.14  Second, this Note will explore how courts have 
analyzed public Ten Commandments displays.15  Third, this Note will 
analyze those court decisions.16  Fourth, this Note will provide a model 
test for courts to use in analyzing public displays of the Ten 
Commandments.17 
II.  THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion.”18  During the past 225 years, 
three different theories of the Establishment Clause have become 
entrenched in Establishment Clause jurisprudence:  strict separation, 
neutrality, and accommodation.19  Of the three theories, neutralism is the 
                                                                                                             
it is displayed with other historical documents that have formed and influenced the United 
States legal or governmental system.  Id.  Politicians may have success in enacting more 
statutes like this one because the public supports Ten Commandments displays.  See Larry 
Copeland, Alabama Judge’s Monument Removed; 77% Back Ten Commandments Display, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 28, 2003, at A.01, available at 2003 WL 5317808 (citing a USA 
Today/CNN/Gallup Poll which showed that 77% of Americans opposed the removal of 
the Ten Commandments from the Alabama Judicial Building); Poll Favors Commandments 
Display, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 7, 2003, at A22, available at 2003 WL 7319671 (citing a survey 
which reported that 73% of Oklahomans would support placing a monument displaying 
the Ten Commandments in the Oklahoma Supreme Court Building). 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 See infra Part III. 
16 See infra Part IV. 
17 See infra Part V. 
18 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  In its entirety, the First Amendment reads, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  Id.  
The First Amendment is applied to state and local governments pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
19 ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.2.1 (2d ed. 
2002).  Strict separationists seek to erect a wall between church and state and to keep the 
wall “high and impregnable.”  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).  Neutralists 
believe government should not favor religion over secularism or secularism over religion.  
CHEMERINSKY, supra, § 12.2.1.  Accomodationists allow for government to recognize 
religion so long as government does not establish a church or coerce religious participation.  
Id. 
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most advocated theory,20 and it has recently established a strong 
foothold in Establishment Clause jurisprudence due to Justice 
O’Connor’s introduction of the Endorsement Test, a test designed to 
promote neutrality.21  Part II of this Note will discuss the development 
and the application of the Endorsement Test.  Part II.A will explain the 
Lemon Test, the Endorsement Test’s predecessor.22  Part II.B will trace the 
development of the Endorsement Test through the concurring opinions 
of Justice O’Connor.23  Finally, Part II.C will explore how federal circuits 
have applied the Endorsement Test.24       
A. The Lemon Test  
In 1971, the Supreme Court ushered in a new era of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence when it announced for the first time, in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,25 an analysis for alleged Establishment Clause violations.26  
After Lemon, to withstand a challenge to the Establishment Clause, 
                                                 
20 Several reasons exist for why neutralism is the most advocated theory.  First, the 
theory of strict separation has generally been abolished.  Id.  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly denied the proposition that government must be separated from religion by a 
wall.  See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (allowing the Deseret Gymnasium, a public facility associated 
with the Mormon Church, to discriminate on religious grounds in hiring for nonreligious 
jobs); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the State of Nebraska’s tradition 
of opening each legislative session with prayer by a chaplain who is paid out of public 
funds).  Even when the Court stated, “The First Amendment has erected a wall between 
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable.  We could not approve the 
slightest breach,” it did not require strict separation.  Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.  In Everson, the 
Court upheld a New Jersey statute, which authorized parents to be reimbursed for the 
costs incurred for transporting their children to sectarian schools.  Id.  Second, neutralism 
appeals to many because “it evokes the image of a government which can stand 
dispassionately above the fray, shunning involvement in religious disputes while 
maintaining a fair and impartial stance that offends none of the parties to such disputes.”  
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:  Establishment Neutrality and the 
‘No Endorsement’ Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 313 (1987). 
21 See infra Parts II.B.3, II.B.5, II.C, III.C. 
22 See infra Part II.A. 
23 See infra Part II.B. 
24 See infra Part II.C. 
25 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  In Lemon, the plaintiffs challenged two state statutes, which 
authorized the expenditure of government funds to church-related schools.  Id. at 606.  A 
Rhode Island statute authorized the state to supplement the salaries of teachers in 
nonpublic schools if, among other criteria, the teacher only taught subjects which were 
taught in public schools.  Id. at 608.  A Pennsylvania statute allowed the state to reimburse 
nonpublic schools for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials if the teachers 
taught secular subjects and the textbooks and materials were used for secular subjects.  Id. 
at 609-10. 
26 Id. at 612-13. 
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government action must have a secular purpose, its primary effect must 
neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster an excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.27    
For approximately the next fifteen years, the Court applied the 
Lemon Test to almost all alleged Establishment Clause violations.28  
                                                 
27 After applying these three prongs to the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes, the 
Court declared both statutes unconstitutional.  Id. at 607.  The Court held that both states 
had a secular purpose in enacting the statutes—to “enhance the quality of the secular 
education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws.”  Id. at 613.  The Court 
did not reach a conclusion on whether the primary purpose of the statutes was to advance 
or inhibit religion because the Court concluded that the statutes created an excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.  Id. at 613-14.  The Court wrote: 
We need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial schools will 
be guilty of bad faith or any conscious design to evade the limitations 
imposed by the statute and the First Amendment.  We simply 
recognize that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school 
affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will 
inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral. 
Id. at 618.  The Court reasoned that because government surveillance would be needed to 
make sure that the statutes were complied with, the statutes created an excessive 
entanglement.  Id. at 619. 
 The Court took these three prongs from two previous Supreme Court cases; the first 
two prongs came from Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) and the third prong 
came from Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).  Id. at 612-13.  In Allen, the Court 
upheld New York’s Education Law, which required local public schools to lend textbooks 
free of charge to all students in grades seven through twelve, regardless of whether the 
student attended a public or parochial school.  392 U.S. at 236-37.  The Court stated the test 
for determining which contacts between church and state were permissible under the 
Establishment Clause was “[W]hat are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment?”  
Id. at 243.  The Court held that New York’s purpose in enacting the statute, to further the 
educational opportunities of the students, was a legitimate purpose.  Id.  The Court further 
held that the primary effect of the statute was not to promote religion because parochial 
schools would not use the textbooks to teach religion.  Id. at 248.  In Walz, the Court upheld 
a New York City tax exemption granted to religious organizations for property used solely 
for religious worship.  397 U.S. at 664.  In its reasoning, the Court stated, “We must also be 
sure that the end result—the effect—is not an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.”  Id. at 674.  The Court reasoned that New York City did not excessively entangle 
itself with religion because in granting the tax exemption, New York City did not transfer 
any of its revenue to a church, but rather, it only refrained from demanding certain taxes.  
Id. at 675.  The Court further reasoned that the tax exemption did not create excessive 
entanglement because the exemption restricted the fiscal relationship between the city and 
the churches.  Id. at 676. 
28 The Court did not apply the Lemon Test in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).  In 
Marsh, the Court upheld Nebraska’s practice of paying a chaplain to pray before each 
legislative session.  Id. at 783-84.  The Court noted the long historical practice of opening 
legislative sessions with prayer:  the Continental Congress opened each session with a 
prayer by a paid chaplain; the First Congress adopted a policy of selecting a chaplain to 
open each session with prayer; and the First Congress adopted this policy three days before 
the language of the Bill of Rights was agreed upon.  Id. at 783-88.  The Court reasoned that 
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Although the Lemon Test was applied consistently, it was not without its 
opponents.29  Despite the opposition, a new test for Establishment Clause 
challenges did not begin to form and to take root until 1984 when Justice 
                                                                                                             
because the First Congress agreed to open its sessions with a prayer by a government paid 
chaplain before it adopted the language of the First Amendment, the framers “saw no real 
threat to the Establishment Clause arising from a practice of prayer similar to that now 
challenged.”  Id. at 791. 
29 A frequent criticism of the Lemon Test was that it led to inconsistent, and often 
irreconcilable, results.  See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial 
Schools—An Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5, 6-7 (1987) [hereinafter Choper, Establishment Clause]. 
Choper provided a list of inconsistent decisions by the Supreme Court after it began using 
the Lemon Test: (1) government can finance bussing for children attending parochial 
schools, but government cannot finance bussing from the parochial school to cultural and 
scientific centers; (2) government can lend textbooks to children attending parochial 
schools, but government cannot lend instructional materials to either the parochial school 
or to the children attending the parochial school; (3) a public school teacher cannot enter a 
parochial school to provide remedial services, but the public school teacher can provide 
these services to children attending a parochial school when the children are outside of the 
parochial school; and (4) government cannot finance achievement tests when the parochial 
school prepares the tests, but government can finance achievement tests if the tests are 
prepared by state officials even if the tests are administered by parochial school teachers.  
Id. 
 Another frequent criticism of the Lemon Test was that it created a tension between the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.  Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: 
Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499, 501 (2002) [hereinafter Choper, Endorsement 
Test].  Because the first prong of the Lemon Test required a secular purpose, it seemingly 
made all “exemptions from onerous obligations for religion unconstitutional.”  Id. 
 Justice White repeatedly criticized the Lemon Test and argued that it imposed 
unnecessary tests for analyzing alleged Establishment Clause violations.  See, e.g., Roemer 
v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (“The threefold test of 
Lemon I imposes unnecessary, and . . . superfluous tests for establishing ‘when the State’s 
involvement with religion passes the peril point’ for First Amendment purposes.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 Despite all the criticism of the Lemon Test, no elaboration on it can compare with 
Justice Scalia’s vivid description of it in 1993.  See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justice Thomas, wrote, “Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits 
up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks 
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little child and school 
attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District.”  Id. at 398.  He explained: 
It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but 
we can command it to return the tomb at will.  When we wish to strike 
down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a 
practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely.  Sometimes, we take a middle 
course, calling its three prongs “no more than helpful signposts.”  Such 
a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a 
somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him. 
Id. at 399 (citations omitted). 
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O’Connor formulated the Endorsement Test, which she refined in a 
series of concurring opinions.30 
B. The Development of the Endorsement Test 
The Endorsement Test started small in 1984, articulated by Justice 
O’Connor in a concurring opinion not joined by any other Justice.31  But 
it grew, and it was adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court five 
years later and is still being used by the Court over twenty years later.32 
1. Lynch v. Donnelly:  The Beginning of the Endorsement Test 
In Lynch v. Donnelly,33 citizens of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, alleged 
that the city’s holiday display, which included a crèche, a Santa Claus 
house, reindeer, candy-striped poles, carolers, a Christmas tree, cut-outs 
of a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, and a “Seasons Greetings” 
banner, violated the Establishment Clause.34  Both the plurality and 
Justice O’Connor, in a concurrence, held that the display did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.35   
a. The Plurality Opinion 
Applying the Lemon Test, the plurality held that the holiday display 
was constitutional.36  The plurality began its analysis by noting that the 
                                                 
30 See infra Part II.B. 
31 See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
32 See infra Parts II.B.3, II.C. 
33 465 U.S. 668 (1984).  For articles discussing Lynch, see generally David C. Fairchild, 
Lynch v. Donnelly: The Case for the Crèche, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 459 (1985); William Van 
Alstyne, Comment, Trends in the Supreme Court:  Mr. Jefferson’s Crumbling Wall–A Comment 
on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770 (1984). 
34 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.  The city erected the holiday display in a park owned by a 
nonprofit organization.  Id.  A crèche is a visual representation of the manger scene shortly 
after the birth of Jesus in Bethlehem.  County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 580 
(1989).  The crèche is an inherently religious symbol and to Christians, it is the “central 
religious symbol of the Christmas holiday.”  Id. at 627.  The crèche in Lynch consisted of 
figurines, ranging in size from five feet to five inches, of Baby Jesus, Mary, Joseph, angels, 
shepherds, kings, and animals.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. 
35 Id. at 687.  Chief Justice Burger wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Justices 
Powell, White, and Rehnquist.  Id. at 670. 
36 Id. at 687.  The Court repeatedly stated that the First Amendment does not require 
complete separation between church and state: “[T]otal separation of the two is not 
possible. . . . Nor does the Constitution require complete separation of church and state; it 
affirmatively mandates accommodation. . . . [T]he Court consistently has declined to take a 
rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment Clause.”  Id. at 672, 673, 678. 
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crèche must be examined within the context of the Christmas season.37  
Given this context, the plurality reasoned that the city’s purposes of 
celebrating the holiday season and depicting the origins of Christmas 
were legitimate secular purposes.38  In assessing the effect of the display, 
the plurality noted that some government advancement of religion is 
permissible.39  Therefore, the plurality held that the display’s primary 
effect was not to advance religion because the benefit to Christianity was 
“indirect, remote and incidental.”40 
b. The Concurrence 
Agreeing with the plurality that the holiday display did not violate 
the Establishment Clause, Justice O’Connor began her concurrence by 
stating that government can violate the Establishment Clause in one of 
two ways:  (1) excessive entanglement with private institutions; or (2) 
endorsement or disapproval of religion.41  Justice O’Connor defined 
endorsement as “send[ing] a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
                                                 
37 Id.  The Court cited two previous cases, Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) and School 
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), in which the Court declared 
certain religious practices unconstitutional, but left open the possibility that the same 
religious practices might be constitutional within a different context.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.  
For a discussion of Stone, see infra Part III.A.  In Abington, the Court declared 
unconstitutional two state laws, which required daily Bible reading in public schools.  374 
U.S. at 203.  But the Court rejected the notion that the Bible cannot have a legitimate 
purpose in a student’s education.  Id. at 225.  The Court wrote: 
It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary 
and historic qualities.  Nothing we have said here indicates that such 
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of 
a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with 
the First Amendment. 
Id. 
38 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681. 
39 Id.  Prior to making this statement, the Court looked at previous government actions it 
had allowed: expenditures of public money on textbooks for sectarian schools, 
expenditures of public money for transporting students to sectarian schools, tax 
exemptions for church property, and federal grants to church-sponsored colleges.  Id. at 
681-82.  The Court then stated, “We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving 
from inclusion of the crèche than from these benefits and endorsements previously held 
not violative of the Establishment Clause.”  Id. at 682. 
40 Id. at 683. 
41 Id. at 688.  Justice O’Connor explained that excessive entanglement between 
government and religious institutions could lead to religious institutions losing their 
independence, religious institutions receiving access to government or to governmental 
powers, and creating political constituencies based on religious belief.  Id.  She then stated 
that excessive entanglement was not an issue.  Id. at 689. 
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members of the political community.  Disapproval sends the opposite 
message.”42  In determining whether government has endorsed religion, 
Justice O’Connor said that two messages must be analyzed:  (1) the 
message government intended to convey; and (2) the message actually 
conveyed.43 
To analyze a challenge to the Establishment Clause focusing on these 
two messages, Justice O’Connor refined both the purpose prong and the 
effects prong of the Lemon Test.44  According to Justice O’Connor, the 
relevant question under the purpose prong became “whether the 
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval 
of religion.”45  As to the effects prong, Justice O’Connor stated that a 
government practice may not have the effect of communicating a 
message of endorsement.46  She then explained that a setting may change 
the message of the display.47  In finding the display constitutional, Justice 
                                                 
42 Id. at 688.  Some commentators have labeled this the “outsiders argument.”  See 
generally W. Scott Simpson, Lemon Reconstituted:  Justice O’Connor’s Proposed Modifications of 
the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 BYU L. Rev. 465, 472 (1986) (“[S]tate 
religiously-oriented activities should be closely scrutinized because they convey to 
religious minorities, who do not participate in those activities, a sense that they are 
outsiders.”). 
43 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.  Both messages must be analyzed, Justice O’Connor explained, 
because some listeners do not rely solely on the words themselves, rather they will examine 
the context of the message and ask questions of the speaker to discern the intended 
message, while others will rely completely on the words themselves.  Id. 
44 Id. at 690-91. 
45 Id. at 691.  Justice O’Connor found that the state did not intend to convey a message of 
endorsement through the crèche.  Id.  She stated the purpose in including the crèche in the 
holiday display was to celebrate the holiday through its traditional symbols and not to 
promote the religious content of the crèche.  Id. 
46 Id. at 692.  Specifically, Justice O’Connor stated, “What is crucial is that a government 
practice not have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or 
disapproval of religion.  It is only practices having that effect, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the 
political community.”  Id. 
47 Id.  In Lynch, Justice O’Connor implied that the relevant perceptions were the 
perceptions of real human beings—either citizens of Pawtucket or citizens of the United 
States.  Smith, supra note 20, at 291.  In his article, Smith criticized this approach, arguing 
that allowing the perceptions of real humans to dictate would result in government 
paralysis.  Id.  Because the United States has such a great diversity of religions, almost any 
government action would be seen as an endorsement of religion by someone.  Id.  He also 
argued that allowing the perceptions to be based on a majority of citizens’ feelings would 
contradict the purpose of the Endorsement Test, because the religious viewpoint of the 
majority would be endorsed, while ignoring the religious choices of the minority.  Id. at 
292. 
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O’Connor did not deny the religious nature of the crèche, but stated that 
the holiday setting negated any message of endorsement.48 
2. Wallace v. Jaffree:  The Observer Becomes Objective 
Justice O’Connor commenced her refinement of the Endorsement 
Test a year later in Wallace v. Jaffree.49  In Wallace, the plaintiffs challenged 
three Alabama statutes that provided for a minute of silence in all public 
schools for meditation or prayer and that authorized teachers to lead 
willing students in a prayer addressed to “Almighty God.”50  A plurality 
and Justice O’Connor, in a concurrence, held that the statutes violated 
the Establishment Clause.51   
Justice O’Connor began her analysis of the statutes by stating that 
the Endorsement Test precludes government from conveying or 
attempting to convey a message that certain religious beliefs are favored, 
but that it does not preclude government from acknowledging religion.52  
                                                 
48 Lynch, 465 U.S at 692.  Justice O’Connor compared the crèche in the holiday display to 
a religious painting in a museum.  Id.  Just as the museum setting negated any message of 
religious endorsement from a painting, the holiday display negated any religious 
endorsement from the crèche.  Id. 
 She also compared the crèche to other government “acknowledgements” of religion 
such as legislative prayer, presidential declarations of Thanksgiving as a national holiday, 
printing “In God We Trust” on coins, and opening Supreme Court sessions with “God save 
the United States and this honorable court.”  Id. at 692-93.  Because these government 
acknowledgements have the purpose “of solemnizing public occasions, expressing 
confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation 
in society,” and because of their “history and ubiquity,” these practices do not have the 
effect of endorsing religion.  Id. at 693. 
49 472 U.S. 38 (1985).  For articles discussing the Court’s holding in Wallace, see generally 
Rodney K. Smith, Now is the Time for Reflection: Wallace v. Jaffree and its Legislative 
Aftermath, 37 ALA. L. REV. 345 (1986); Patrick F. Brown, Note, Wallace v. Jaffree and the Need 
to Reform Establishment Clause Analysis, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 573 (1986); Douglas E. Hoffman, 
Comment, Establishment Clause Analysis: An Apology for the Lemon Test in the Wake of 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 30 S.D. L. REV. 599 (1985). 
50 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40. 
51 Id. at 61, 67.  Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Justices 
Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall.  Id. at 40.  Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion.  Id. 
at 62. 
 The plurality declared the statutes unconstitutional because the Alabama legislature 
lacked a secular purpose in enacting the statutes.  Id. at 56.  The plurality looked at 
statements made by Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the statutes, in which he said 
that he wanted to put voluntary prayer back into schools.  Id. at 57. 
52 Id. at 70.  At the beginning of her concurrence, Justice O’Connor articulated two 
reasons for why she believed the Endorsement Test was the better test for alleged 
Establishment Clause violations:  (1) the Endorsement Test was capable of consistent 
application; and (2) the Endorsement Test inquired into the legislative purpose.  Id. at 68-
69. 
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As to the purpose prong, Justice O’Connor agreed with the plurality that 
Alabama lacked any secular purpose for the statutes.53  As to the effects 
prong, Justice O’Connor enunciated a succinct question for courts to use 
in analyzing the effect:  “[W]hether an objective observer, acquainted 
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, 
would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools.”54   
3. County of Allegheny v. ACLU:  The Adoption of the Endorsement Test  
The next major progression in the development of the Endorsement 
Test occurred four years later in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.55  In 
Allegheny, the plaintiffs challenged two holiday displays:  (1) a crèche on 
the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse; and (2) a 
menorah placed alongside a forty-five foot decorated Christmas tree 
outside Pittsburgh’s City-County Building.56  The Court held, vis-à-vis 
five opinions, that the crèche, but not the menorah, violated the 
                                                 
53 Id. at 77. 
54 Id. at 76.  Because she had already concluded that the statutes violated the purpose 
prong, Justice O’Connor did not analyze the effects on the objective observer other than to 
say it seemed likely that the message conveyed to the objective observer was approval of 
the child who chose prayer over the available alternatives.  Id. at 78. 
 In Wallace, Justice O’Connor changed the relevant perceptions; the relevant 
perceptions are no longer from any person but from an objective observer.  Id.  This 
approach has been met with much criticism.  See William P. Marshall, “We Know It When 
We See It” The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 536-37 (1986) (arguing 
that true objectivity will never be achieved because people, whether areligious, 
separationists, or agnostics, would rather assume themselves as reasonable than use an 
external standard); Smith, supra note 20, at 292-95.  Smith criticized this approach because 
the hypothetical objective observer will only know as much as its maker wants to know 
and because the hypothetical objective observer will be deemed aware of the legislative 
history, allowing the observer to know the government’s purpose, thus collapsing the two 
prongs of the Endorsement Test into one prong.  Smith, supra note 20, at 292-95. 
55 492 U.S. 573 (1989).  For articles discussing the Court’s holding in Allegheny, see 
generally George M. Janocsko, Beyond the “Plastic Reindeer Rule”:  The Curious Case of 
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 445 (1990); Steven 
A. Seidman, County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union:  Embracing the 
Endorsement Test, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 211 (1991); Keith O. McArtor, Note and Comment, A 
Conservative Struggles with Lemon: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s Dissent in Allegheny, 26 
TULSA L.J. 107 (1990); Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU:  Evolution of Chaos 
in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503 (1990); Jeffrey R. Wagener, Comment, 
A Survey of the Supreme Court’s Approach to the Establishment Clause in Light of County of 
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 169 (1990). 
56 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578.  Alongside the menorah and tree was a sign saluting liberty.  
Id.  A menorah is a nine-branched candelabrum used by Jews to celebrate the holiday of 
Hanukkah.  ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1438 (3d Cir. 1997).  The lighting of the 
candles in the menorah is the central event of Hanukkah.  Id.  However, Hanukkah is not 
one of the main religious holidays in Judaism.  Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 [2004], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss1/7
2004] Analyzing Public Displays of the Ten Commandments 231 
 
Establishment Clause.57  For the first time, and despite a strenuous 
objection from Justice Kennedy, a majority of the Court used the 
Endorsement Test to analyze a challenge to the Establishment Clause.58   
                                                 
57 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 574.  Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, 
concluding that the crèche, but not the menorah, violated the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 
578-621.  Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion.  Id. at 623-37.  Justice Brennan wrote 
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that both displays violated 
the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 637-46.  Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, also arguing that both displays violated the Establishment 
Clause.  Id. at 646-55.  Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, arguing that both the crèche and the menorah were constitutional displays.  Id. at 
670-78. 
58 Id. at 593-94.  Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and 
O’Connor, wrote, “The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from 
appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from ‘making adherence to a 
religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.’”  Id. 
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 In his dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia 
and White, articulated three arguments against the Endorsement Test.  Allegheny, 492 U.S. 
at 670-78.  First, he argued that the Endorsement Test, if applied faithfully, would 
invalidate many of the country’s traditional practices.  Id. at 671.  He provided the example 
of Thanksgiving Proclamations, through which Presidents have established a national day 
of celebration and prayer.  Id.  He wrote, “It requires little imagination to conclude that 
these proclamations would cause nonadherents to feel excluded, yet they have been a part 
of our national heritage from the beginning.”  Id.  Justice Kennedy reasoned: 
Either the endorsement test must invalidate scores of traditional 
practices recognizing the place religion holds in our culture, or it must 
be twisted and stretched to avoid inconsistency with practices we 
know to have been permitted in the past, while condemning similar 
practices with no greater endorsement effect simply by reason of their 
lack of historical antecedent.  Neither result is acceptable. 
Id. at 674. 
 Second, Justice Kennedy argued that allowing a religious display to have its meaning 
changed because of its context allows for a “jurisprudence of minutiae.”  Id.  In Justice 
Kennedy’s words, the Endorsement Test: 
[C]ould provide workable guidance to the lower courts, if ever, only 
after this Court has decided a long series of holiday display cases, 
using little more than intuition and a tape measure.  Deciding cases on 
the basis of such unguided examination of marginalia is irreconcilable 
with the imperative of applying neutral principles in constitutional 
adjudication. 
Id. at 675-76. 
 Third, Justice Kennedy argued that “the clearest illustration of the unwisdom of the 
endorsement test” is that the Endorsement Test lends itself to an inquiry of how many 
adhere to a particular religion, and he stated: “Those religions enjoying the largest 
following must be consigned to the status of least favored faiths so as to avoid any possible 
risk of offending members of minority religions.”  Id. at 677.  In one final statement of 
disgust for the Endorsement Test, Justice Kennedy said, “Indeed, were I required to choose 
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Justice O’Connor, along with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, 
and Stevens, held that the crèche violated the Establishment Clause.59  In 
its reasoning, the Court stated that the crèche communicated a religious 
message.60  The Court differentiated this crèche from the crèche in 
Lynch.61  Unlike the crèche in Lynch, the crèche in the Allegheny 
                                                                                                             
between the approach taken by the majority and a strict separationist view, I would have to 
respect the consistency of the latter.”  Id. at 678. 
 Despite Justice Kennedy’s denouncement of the Endorsement Test, Justice O’Connor 
continued to believe that the Endorsement Test asked the right questions about religious 
displays and that it was capable of consistent application.  Id. at 628-29.  Justice O’Connor 
explained that the Endorsement Test would not invalidate long-standing religious practices 
because imputing the reasonable observer with knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of 
the challenged action would provide part of the context.  Id. at 630-31. 
 Justice Kennedy also articulated his own test for alleged Establishment Clause 
violations:  the Coercion Test.  Id. at 659.  Under the Coercion Test, government action is 
not unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause unless government coerces someone 
to support or to participate in a religious exercise or if government gives direct benefits to 
religious organizations in such a way as to create a state religion.  Id.  Applying the 
Coercion Test to the crèche and the menorah, Justice Kennedy found both displays 
constitutional because no one was compelled to participate in a religious activity, 
government did not spend significant amounts of taxpayer money to pay for the displays, 
and because the crèche and menorah were passive displays.  Id. at 664.  He further 
explained that any person who disagreed with the crèche or menorah could easily ignore it.  
Id. 
 Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas have 
continued to adhere to the Coercion Test.  See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  
However, Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia have articulated different definitions of 
coercion.  Id. at 636-44.  According to Justice Scalia, coercion carries with it the “force of law 
and threat of penalty.”  Id. at 640.  But according to Justice Kennedy, coercion can be subtle 
and indirect.  Id. at 592-93. 
 In Lee, the plaintiffs challenged a school policy that allowed the principle to invite 
clergy to give non-sectarian prayers at middle school and high school graduations.  Id. at 
580.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, found the policy unconstitutional because the 
school’s control of the graduation ceremony placed public and peer pressure on the 
graduating students to join the clergy in the prayer.  Id. at 586, 593.  Justice Scalia, writing 
for the dissent, found the policy to be constitutional because the graduating students were 
not required to attend the graduation ceremonies and because the students received no 
punishment for not joining the clergy in prayer.  Id. at 640-44. 
 Justice Kennedy has continued to hold that coercion can be accomplished through 
social pressure.  See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 297-98 (2000).  In Santa 
Fe, Justice Kennedy joined five other Justices in striking down a high school policy that 
allowed student led prayers before high school football games.  Id.  As part of its reasoning, 
the Court explained that many students feel pressure to attend high school football games.  
Id. at 310-13. 
59 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602. 
60 Id. at 598.  The Court stated the crèche’s religious meaning was “unmistakably clear” 
because it portrayed the nativity scene and because the words “Glory to God in the 
Highest” were written above the angel.  Id. 
61 Id.  For a description of the crèche’s context in Lynch, see supra text accompanying note 
34. 
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Courthouse had nothing in its context to detract from its religious 
message.62  Finally, the Court noted the location of the crèche:  the Grand 
Staircase, the “most beautiful part” of the building.63  Because of this 
location, the Court held that no reasonable viewer could think that 
government did not support or approve the crèche.64 
Justices O’Connor and Blackmun parted ways with Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens, and joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Kennedy, Scalia, and White, in holding that the menorah was 
constitutional.65  Justice Blackmun stated that the result of placing the 
                                                 
62 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598.  The County of Allegheny tried to argue that the crèche’s 
context negated its religious message.  Id. at 598-99.  First, the county argued that the floral 
decoration surrounding the crèche detracted from its religious message.  Id.  The Court 
rejected this argument because the floral frame attracted the viewers’ attention to the 
crèche.  Id. at 599.  Second, the county argued that the crèche’s religious message was 
diminished because the crèche was in the background during the annual Christmas carol 
program.  Id.  The Court rejected this argument because most viewers observed the crèche 
when the choir was not singing and because most of the carols that were sung were 
religious in nature.  Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 598-600.  Allegheny contains a dispute regarding the identity of the observer.  
James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial Twist of Lemon:  The Endorsement 
Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 690-91 (1990).  
Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, used the phrases “reasonable observer” and “objective 
observer”; whereas, Justices Blackmun and O’Connor only used the phrase “reasonable 
observer.”  Id.  Lewis and Vild argued that because both Justices Blackmun and O’Connor 
used only “reasonable observer” that they viewed a reasonable observer as an 
improvement over an objective observer.  Id.  However, they contend that a reasonable 
observer is not an improvement.  Id.  They noted that “reasonable,” when used in other 
contexts such as torts, contracts, or criminal law is always used to standardize judgment.  
Id. at 691.  They argued that one cannot standardize judgment in regards to religion, and 
wrote, “[A] reasonable Jew will have a different perspective than a reasonable Protestant or 
a reasonable Muslim, and a reasonable Atheist will have a different perspective than any 
Theist.”  Id. at 692.  They concluded, “Whereas reasonable people of different religions may 
agree upon the standard of care in building a haystack, they are likely to disagree on what 
constitutes an endorsement of religion.”  Id. at 692-93; cf. ACLU v. Rutherford County, 209 
F. Supp. 2d 799, 814 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).  In Rutherford County, the court stated, “[R]eligious 
differences create more deep-seated emotions and harsh reactions than most any other 
subject.  Religious fervor has divided families, friends, neighbors, communities, and even 
nations.  The evening news is filled with accounts of nations embroiled in religious wars 
and conflicts . . . .”  Id. 
65 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 621-32, 637, 655.  Although Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Stevens agreed that the Endorsement Test was the correct test to use, they disagreed upon 
its application to the menorah.  Id. at 643.  They disagreed that a Christmas tree, a largely 
secular symbol of Christmas, could minimize the religious significance of the menorah.  Id. 
at 639.  Justice Brennan wrote, “That the tree may, without controversy, be deemed a 
secular symbol if found alone does not mean that it will be so seen when combined with 
other symbols or objects.”  Id.  Rather, he argued that the menorah could bring back some 
of the religious aspects of the Christmas tree.  Id. at 640-43.  He argued that because the 
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menorah next to the Christmas tree created a holiday setting that 
represented both Christmas and Chanukah.66  However, he explained 
that the display’s constitutionality depended on whether Pittsburgh 
intended to celebrate Christmas and Chanukah as religious holidays or 
as secular holidays.67  He held that a reasonable observer would 
conclude that Pittsburgh intended to celebrate them as secular holidays 
because the Christmas tree, a secular symbol of Christmas, was the 
dominant element in the display.68    
Justice O’Connor came to a different conclusion about the message 
received by a reasonable observer.  Justice O’Connor’s reasonable 
observer received the message that Pittsburgh was trying to 
acknowledge cultural diversity and to convey tolerance of religious 
beliefs by recognizing that the winter holiday is celebrated in a diversity 
of ways.69  Justice O’Connor concluded that Pittsburgh conveyed a 
message of pluralism by accompanying the Christmas tree, a secular 
symbol, with a menorah, a Jewish symbol.70 
                                                                                                             
reasonable observer could conclude either that the Christmas tree minimized the religious 
significance of the menorah or that the menorah maximized the religious significance of the 
Christmas tree that both messages had to be analyzed.  Id. at 642. 
 In addition, Justice Brennan disagreed that the Christmas tree was the predominant 
element in the display.  Id.  First, he argued that an eighteen-foot menorah was far more 
eye-catching than a regularly sized Christmas tree; and second, he argued that the single-
messaged menorah dominated the Christmas tree, which lacked a clear message.  Id.  In 
conclusion, Justice Brennan wrote, “I shudder to think that the only ‘reasonable observer’ is 
one who shares the particular views on perspective, spacing, and accent expressed in 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN’s opinion, thus making analysis under the Establishment Clause look 
more like an exam in Art 101 than an inquiry into constitutional law.”  Id. at 642-43. 
66 Id. at 614. 
67 Id. at 615.  Justice Blackmun wrote, “The simultaneous endorsement of Judaism and 
Christianity is no less constitutionally infirm than the endorsement of Christianity alone.”  
Id. 
68 Id. at 616-17.  Justice Blackmun concluded that the forty-five foot Christmas tree was 
the predominant element in the display because it occupied the central position beneath 
the archway in the entrance to the City-County Building, while the eighteen-foot menorah 
was positioned on one side of the Christmas tree.  Id. at 617. 
69 Id. at 635-36. 
70 Id. at 635.  Justice O’Connor stated that the religious significance of the menorah was 
not neutralized by the Christmas tree or the liberty sign, but that the Christmas tree and the 
liberty sign changed the message of the display.  Id. 
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4. Capital Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette:  The Knowledge of 
the Reasonable Observer 
The refinement of the Endorsement Test continued in Capital Square 
Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette.71  In Pinette, Justice O’Connor and 
Justice Stevens disagreed on the amount of knowledge that should be 
imputed to the reasonable observer.72   
Justice O’Connor began her concurrence by stating that the 
Endorsement Test should not focus on the actual perceptions of 
individuals, but rather on the perceptions of a reasonable observer who 
is similar to the “reasonable person” in tort law.73  She then imputed 
                                                 
71 515 U.S. 753 (1995).  In Pinette, the Ku Klux Klan applied for a permit to place a cross 
on Capital Square, a ten-acre plaza surrounding the statehouse in Columbus, Ohio.  Id. at 
757-58.  Although Capital Square had been used as a gathering place for speeches and 
festivals for the past one hundred years, the Advisory Board denied the Ku Klux Klan’s 
application.  Id. 
 The plurality, consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas, held, using a forum analysis, that the Advisory Board violated the Ku Klux Klan’s 
free speech rights because Capital Square was a public forum and because an 
Establishment Clause defense did not justify the Advisory Board’s content-based restriction 
in denying the Ku Klux Klan’s application.  Id. at 761-63.  The plurality refused to apply the 
Endorsement Test because, as Justice Scalia explained, there was a crucial difference 
between government speech endorsing religion and private speech, which the government 
protects under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.  Id. at 765.  The Endorsement 
Test was applied by Justice O’Connor, who wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices 
Souter and Breyer, and by Justice Stevens, who wrote a dissenting opinion.  Id. at 772-83, 
797-815. 
 For articles discussing the Court’s holding in Pinette, see generally Alberto B. Lopez, 
Equal Access and the Public Forum:  Pinette’s Imbalance of Free Speech and Establishment, 55 
BAYLOR L. REV. 167 (2003); David Goldberger, Capital Square Review and Advisory Board 
v. Pinette, Beware of Justice Scalia’s Per Se Rule, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1997); Philip C. 
Kissam, Aesthetics of the Cross:  Competing Interpretations of the Ku Klux Klan Cross in Capital 
Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (Spring 1996); 
Richard E. Levy, Dueling Values:  Balancing Competing Constitutional Interests in Pinette, 5 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 43 (Spring 1996). 
72 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5. 
73 Id. at 778-80.  Justice O’Connor argued that allowing the reasonable observer to be 
based on the perceptions of an actual person would prohibit almost all governmental 
displays because “[t]here is always someone who, with a particular quantum of knowledge, 
reasonably might perceive a particular action as an endorsement of religion.”  Id. at 780.  
Justice O’Connor further argued that government has not made religion relevant to 
political standing in the community merely because someone might feel uncomfortable 
viewing a religious display.  Id. 
 The “reasonable person” in tort law is someone who “is not to be identified with any 
ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things; he is a prudent and 
careful person, who is always up to standard . . . he is rather a personification of a 
community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the jury’s social judgment.”  W. 
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knowledge to the reasonable observer.74  First, after stating that the 
knowledge of the reasonable observer is not limited to that simply 
gleaned from viewing the display, she imputed the knowledge that the 
cross is a religious symbol, that Capital Square was government 
property, and that the large building nearby was the seat of the state 
government.75  Second, she also accredited the reasonable observer with 
knowledge of the general history of Capital Square and with the ability 
to recognize the distinction between speech that government supports 
and speech that government allows in a public forum.76 
Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice O’Connor’s definition of the 
reasonable observer.77  First, he argued that Justice O’Connor’s 
reasonable observer is not equal to the reasonable person in tort law, but 
is rather a “well-schooled jurist, a being finer than the tort-law model.”78  
He explained, “The ideal human JUSTICE O’CONNOR describes knows 
and understands much more than meets the eye.”79  Second, Justice 
Stevens advocated a per se rule that the location of a stationary, 
unattended display is an implicit endorsement by the party or person 
                                                                                                             
PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 175 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
74 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780. 
75 Id. at 780-81.  Justice Stevens also agreed that this knowledge should be imputed to the 
reasonable observer.  Id. at 806-07. 
76 Id. at 780-82.  Because a reasonable observer would know the general history of 
Capital Square, the reasonable observer, according to Justice O’Connor, would also know 
that Capital Square was a public park that had been used by various speakers in the past.  
Id. at 780. 
 For Justice O’Connor, the setting of the cross became as much a part of the context as 
did its location on government property.  Id.  Because a reasonable observer would know 
the difference between speech that government supports and speech that the government 
allows, Justice O’Connor concluded that a reasonable observer would not see the Ku Klux 
Klan’s cross as an endorsement of religion.  Id. at 782. 
77 Id. at 800 n.5. 
78 Id.  Justice Stevens wrote: 
I think this enhanced tort-law standard is singularly out of place in the 
Establishment Clause context.  It strips of constitutional protection 
every reasonable person whose knowledge happens to fall below some 
“‘ideal’” standard.  Instead of protecting only the “ideal” observer, 
then, I would extend protection to the universe of reasonable persons 
and ask whether some viewers of the religious display would be likely 
to perceive a government endorsement. 
Id.  Justice Stevens would not impute the reasonable observer with the knowledge that 
Capital Square had housed prior private displays because, in his opinion, it was highly 
unlikely that many viewers knew this information.  Id. at 808. 
79 Id. at 800 n.5. 
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who owns that property.80  Because the cross was unattended and 
located on government property, Justice Stevens concluded that the cross 
violated the Establishment Clause.81 
5. Recent Establishment Clause Cases:  The Reasonable Observer 
Remains Alive 
In Establishment Clause cases following Pinette, the Supreme Court 
has been less than clear about which test it is using.82  Nonetheless, 
reasonable observer language still appears in the cases.83  In Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe,84 the Court, in striking down a school 
policy that permitted student-led prayer before football games, stated, 
“Regardless of the listener’s support for, or objection to, the message, an 
objective Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably perceive the 
inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of 
approval.”85  In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,86 the Court, in upholding 
                                                 
80 Id. at 801.  Therefore, a reasonable observer would conclude that any display or 
symbol located on government property had been sponsored and endorsed by the 
government.  Id.  This analysis, argued Justice Stevens, would provide First Amendment 
protection to schoolchildren, traveling salesmen, and tourists who are not aware of the 
public nature of Capital Square.  Id. at 808 n.14. 
81 Id. at 815. 
82 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).  The Court in Santa Fe 
did not articulate which test it was using; rather, the Court stated that it was guided by the 
following principle it had announced in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992): 
The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of 
religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by 
the Establishment Clause.  It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the 
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to 
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a 
way which “establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to 
do so.” 
Id. at 302 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).  The Court then analyzed 
the school prayer policy under both the Endorsement Test and the Coercion Test.  Id. at 
301-13; see supra note 58 (explaining how the Coercion Test was applied in Santa Fe 
Independent School District). 
 The Supreme Court has been ambiguous about the correct test to be applied in 
analyzing alleged Establishment Clause violations, which has been made clear in opinions 
by federal appellate courts.  See, e.g., Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 256 
(3d Cir. 2003) (“We must first determine the appropriate framework to use when analyzing 
whether the Ten Commandments plaque violates the Establishment Clause, an inquiry that 
is somewhat murky, even in light of the recent religious display cases decided by the 
Supreme Court.”). 
83 See infra notes 86-87. 
84 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
85 Id. at 308.  The school policy, entitled “Prayer at Football Games,” authorized two 
student elections to determine if a prayer should be given before football games.  Id. at 297.  
In the first election, students would vote on whether a “message[],” “statement[],” or 
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Ohio’s Pilot Project Scholarship Program, stated, “Any objective observer 
familiar with the full history and context of the Ohio program would 
reasonably view it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor 
children in failed schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling 
in general.”87  The Supreme Court’s use of the reasonable observer 
standard in deciding Establishment Clause cases has been mirrored by 
the federal courts.  
C. The Reasonable Observer Standard Applied by the Circuits 
Soon after Lynch, the federal circuits began applying the 
Endorsement Test to Establishment Clause challenges.88  The circuits that 
have applied the Endorsement Test to alleged Establishment Clause 
violations, either as a separate test or as the effects prong of the Lemon 
Test, have adopted Justice O’Connor’s definition of the reasonable 
observer.89   
                                                                                                             
“invocation[]” should be given; in the second election, students would vote on a student 
speaker.  Id. at 297-98.  In the first election, the students voted to allow an invocation; and 
in the second election, the students chose a student speaker.  Id.  The Court did not discuss 
what the objective Santa Fe High School student would know about the policy and 
elections for the student led prayer; however, both Justice O’Connor and Justice Stevens 
agreed that an objective student would receive a message of endorsement.  Id. at 292. 
86 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
87 Id. at 655.  Ohio initiated the Pilot Project Scholarship Program to provide financial 
assistance to families in any school district that had failed to meet certain requirements.  Id. 
at 644-45.  The scholarship program provided parents with tuition aid if they elected to 
choose to send their children to any of the participating private schools and it provided 
extra money to public, community, and magnet schools when parents elected to send their 
children to those schools.  Id. at 646-48. 
88 In 1985, a year after the Lynch decision, the Tenth Circuit applied the Endorsement 
Test in a challenge to a county seal.  Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777 
(10th Cir. 1985).  In Friedman, the plaintiffs challenged a New Mexico county seal inscribed 
with a Latin Cross and the phrase “Con Esta Vencemos,” meaning “With this We 
Conquer.”  Id. at 779.  The court stated the inquiry into the effects prong of the Lemon Test 
as “the existence of a non-secular effect is to be judged by an objective standard, which 
looks only to the reaction of the average receiver of the government communication or 
average observer of the government action.”  Id. at 781.  In determining the effect on an 
average observer, the court heard the testimony of a county commissioner who stated that 
the cross represented the role of the Catholic Church in settling the southwest.  Id. at 779.  
Two historians and an expert in heraldry also testified that the cross on the seal represented 
Catholicism, Christianity, and the Spaniards, and that religious conversion in the 
southwest was often done by force.  Id.  The court then held that the seal conveyed a 
message of endorsement because it recalled a less tolerant time and forecasted its return.  
Id. at 782. 
89 See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.  In 1997, the Third Circuit attempted to 
adopt Justice Stevens’ definition of the reasonable observer.  ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 
1435, 1447-48 (3d Cir. 1997).  In Schundler, for thirty years Jersey City had displayed a 
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The federal circuits generally have not been afraid to impute the 
reasonable observer with knowledge that cannot be gathered from 
observing the display.90  A reasonable observer in the Second Circuit 
does not wear blinders and is not focused solely on the religious 
display.91  A reasonable observer in the Third Circuit has been imputed 
with knowledge of items that are of religious significance to Orthodox 
Jews and with the knowledge of how a city enforces its ordinances.92  
                                                                                                             
crèche during the Christmas season and a menorah during the nine days of Hanukkah on 
the city hall lawn.  Id. at 1438.  Jersey City argued that a “reasonable, informed observer” 
would know of Jersey City’s many celebrations of different cultures and religions.  Id. at 
1447.  The Third Circuit rejected this argument.  Id. at 1449.  The court reasoned that an 
observer who was new to Jersey City and who had no knowledge of Jersey City’s history 
should not be deemed less reasonable, or provided with less constitutional protection, than 
a Christian or a Jew who had lived in Jersey City for twenty years.  Id. at 1448-49. 
 Jersey City, after the initial complaint had been filed, modified the display and erected 
figures of Santa Claus and Frosty the Snowman and a red wooden sled alongside the 
crèche.  Id. at 1439.  In a subsequent suit, the Third Circuit declared this modified display 
constitutional.  ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1999).  The Third Circuit held 
that when analyzing the message conveyed to a reasonable observer, Jersey City’s tradition 
of erecting displays and hosting celebrations for various cultures and religions should be 
considered.  Id. at 106. 
 For a critique of the court’s holding, see Gabriel Acri, American Civil Liberties Union 
of New Jersey v. Schundler: Established Endorsement in Need of “Supreme” Intervention, 40 
CATH. LAW. 165 (2000).  Acri argued that making a reasonable observer aware of the 
history and ubiquity of a religious display would make changing a religious display 
impossible.  Id. at 189.  A reasonable observer, knowing the history of an unconstitutional 
display, would suppose that the message remained the same and that the secular objects 
were added only to make the display constitutional.  Id. 
 The Sixth Circuit demonstrated the difference between the knowledge of an ordinary 
observer and an informed observer.  See ACLU v. Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd., 
243 F.3d 289, 302-03 (6th Cir. 2001).  In declaring Ohio’s state motto, “With God, All Things 
are Possible,” constitutional, the court imputed the reasonable observer with knowledge of 
forty-year old press releases, the text of the New Testament, and philosophical knowledge 
that contributed to the heritage of Ohio.  Id.  The court imputed this knowledge to the 
reasonable observer despite concluding that an average Ohio citizen would have no 
knowledge of the forty-year old press releases or have the vaguest notion of how the motto 
was chosen.  Id. 
90 See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. 
91 Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1997).  In Elewski, the City of 
Syracuse had erected a crèche on a street corner.  Id. at 52.  The city had also decorated 
lampposts around the city with greenery, wreaths, and colored lights, and decorated a park 
with bells, a snowman, and reindeer.  Id.  The court upheld the display of the crèche.  Id. at 
54-55.  Because the reasonable observer is not focused solely on the crèche, the court 
reasoned that an observer would have remembered seeing the other decorations 
throughout the city and would have concluded that the city was not endorsing religion.  Id.  
In addition, the court stated the reasonable observer would have known that the 
downtown merchants supported the display to encourage Christmas shopping.  Id. at 55. 
92 Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 176 (3d Cir. 2002).  In Tenafly, 
an ordinance prohibited any person to place a sign or advertisement on any telephone pole 
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Courts in the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have imputed 
reasonable observers with knowledge of the land where the display is 
located.93  In the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the reasonable observers are 
deemed aware of the purposes behind a city erecting a monument with 
religious overtones.94   
                                                                                                             
without the consent of the borough.  Id. at 151.  However, the borough did not strictly 
enforce the ordinance.  Id.  The plaintiffs, Orthodox Jews, approached the borough about 
erecting an eruv.  Id. at 152.  An eruv is created by placing lechis vertically along utility 
poles.  Id.  The court allowed the plaintiffs to create an eruv because a reasonable observer 
would know that lechis are items of significance to Orthodox Jews, that lechis enable 
Orthodox Jews to engage in activities that are normally prohibited, and that lechis were 
allowed on the utility poles only because of the borough’s selective application of the 
ordinance.  Id. at 176. 
 An eruv is a ceremonial demarcation of an area, and its boundaries are designated by 
overhead utility lines and lechis.  Id. at 152.  Orthodox Jews are prohibited by their faith 
from pushing or carrying any objects outside of their homes on the Sabbath or on Yom 
Kippur.  Id.  However, Orthodox Jews permit themselves to do these activities on the 
Sabbath within an eruv.  Id.  An eruv extends the boundary of the home, permitting 
Orthodox Jews to push strollers and wheelchairs between their home and synagogue.  Id.  
For a more detailed explanation of an eruv, see Shira J. Schlaff, Comment, Using an Eruv to 
Untangle the Boundaries of the Supreme Court’s Religion-Clause Jurisprudence, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 831 (2003). 
93 Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 
1549 (6th Cir. 1992); Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding 
a Christmas display in a public park because “the reasonable observer is aware of Balboa 
Park’s public forum nature and City’s first-come, first-served permit policy.  Our observer 
realizes that the Park . . . host[s] an eclectic range of uses throughout the year”); Chabad-
Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1390 n.11 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that a menorah placed 
on the rotunda of the State Capital was constitutional because a reasonable observer 
“would view the menorah display fully aware that the Rotunda is a public forum in which 
a multiplicity of groups, both secular and religious, have sponsored displays”). 
 In Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Grand Rapids permitted the 
Chabad House to erect a twenty-foot menorah in Calder Plaza, a public park in the center 
of Grand Rapids that had previously been used for rallies, Hunger Walks, festivals, and 
sports exhibitions.  980 F.2d at 1539-40.  In declaring the menorah constitutional, the Sixth 
Circuit stated, “To a reasonable observer, no display actually stands alone in this public 
forum.  In the mind’s eye, the reasonable observer sees the menorah display as but one of a 
long series that has taken place since the Plaza was opened.”  Id. at 1549.  In rejecting the 
passerby as the standard reasonable observer, the court noted that the reasonable observer 
follows local politics and reads the newspapers.  Id. at 1550.  The dissent in Americans 
United for Separation of Church & State argued that Justice Stevens’ definition of the 
reasonable observer should be adopted and stated that the reasonable observer should not 
have to be familiar with the religious demographics of Grand Rapids, the city’s regulations 
concerning the use of Calder Plaza, or the past uses of Calder Plaza.  Id. at 1558. 
94 Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2000); Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 
94 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 In Brooks, the City of Oak Ridge commissioned the making of the “Friendship Bell” to 
commemorate its fiftieth anniversary.  222 F.3d at 262.  Oak Ridge was established in 1942 
after President Theodore Roosevelt designated the land where it sits as the “Manhattan 
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Fueled by a desire to provide a test capable of consistent application 
in analyzing challenges to the Establishment Clause, Justice O’Connor 
introduced the Endorsement Test in her concurring opinion in Lynch.95  
Although a majority of the Supreme Court implicitly adopted the 
Endorsement Test five years later in Allegheny,96 the Court has not been 
able to agree on what knowledge should be imputed to the reasonable 
observer.97  The Supreme Court’s failure to define the knowledge of a 
reasonable observer has resulted in courts using a variety of reasonable 
observers as they have struggled to determine the constitutionality of 
public Ten Commandments displays.   
III.  THE TEN COMMANDMENTS AND THE COURTS 
In analyzing public Ten Commandments displays, lower courts have 
employed the Endorsement Test, but have not always reached consistent 
holdings on what knowledge should be imputed to the reasonable 
observer.98  Part III of this Note will explore how courts have handled 
public displays of the Ten Commandments.  Part III.A will discuss the 
                                                                                                             
Project,” the site where the two atomic bombs that were dropped on Japan were built.  Id. 
at 263 n.1.  The purpose of the Friendship Bell was to commemorate Oak Ridge’s 
connection with Japan and its desire for international peace and friendship.  Id. at 266.  The 
Friendship Bell bared a strong resemblance to bells found in Buddhist temples.  Id. at 262.  
The Friendship Bell was also cast in a traditional ceremony in Japan.  Id. at 263.  The Sixth 
Circuit held that the reasonable observer would not conclude that Oak Ridge was 
endorsing Buddhism because the reasonable observer would have knowledge of the bell 
casting ceremony, the bell’s adoption as a display of the city’s fiftieth anniversary, and the 
city’s statement that the bell was to commemorate Oak Ridge’s connection with Japan.  Id. 
at 266.  The court also assumed that the reasonable observer would not be swayed by any 
newspaper articles that tried to impute quasi-religious qualities to the bell.  Id. 
 In Alvarado, the City of San Jose commissioned a sculpture of Quazalcoatl to 
commemorate the Mexican and Spanish contributions to the culture of San Jose.  94 F.3d at 
1225.  Quazalcoatl, a Mesoamerican creator-deity, was worshipped by the Aztec and 
Mayan civilizations until they were conquered by the Spanish in the sixteenth century.  Id. 
at 1226.  After the Spanish conquest, the religion of the Aztecs and Mayans died.  Id.  San 
Jose argued that because the worship of Quazalcoatl had ceased approximately five 
hundred years earlier that Quazalcoatl was no longer a religious figure.  Id. at 1227.  
However, the plaintiffs argued that Quazalcoatl was a religious figure because worship of 
him was re-emerging with the Zapastistas, revolutionaries in southern Mexico.  Id. at 1231.  
The Ninth Circuit held that the sculpture of Quazalcoatl would not convey a message of 
endorsement because a reasonable observer would be aware that the sculpture represented 
an ancient deity.  Id. at 1232.  The court also stated that the reasonable observer would not 
be an expert on religions practiced by revolutionary groups in Mexico.  Id. 
95 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
97 See supra text accompanying notes 71-81. 
98 See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court’s limited treatment of the Ten Commandments.99  Part 
III.B will note various secular purposes courts have found for displaying 
the Ten Commandments.100  Part III.C will explore how courts have 
analyzed public displays of the Ten Commandments using the 
reasonable observer standard.101 
A. The Supreme Court and the Ten Commandments 
The Supreme Court has provided minimal guidance on the 
constitutionality of public displays of the Ten Commandments.102  In 
Stone v. Graham,103 the Court struck down a Kentucky statute that 
required a copy of the Ten Commandments to be posted in all public 
school classrooms.104  In striking down the statute, the Court emphasized 
that the Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text.105  However, 
the Court did not rule out the possibility that a Ten Commandments 
display might be constitutional; the Court stated, “This is not a case in 
which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school 
curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an 
appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or 
the like.”106 
B. Secular Purposes for Posting the Ten Commandments 
The Ten Commandments, located in the Old Testament at Exodus 
20:2-17 and Deuteronomy 5:6-21, is a sacred religious text to Protestants, 
Catholics, and Jews.107  Like the Court in Stone, lower courts have not 
                                                 
99 See infra Part III.A. 
100 See infra Part III.B. 
101 See infra Part III.C. 
102 The Supreme Court has only ruled on one case involving the Ten Commandments, 
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).  See infra text accompanying notes 103-06. 
103 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
104 Id. at 41. 
105 Id.  Specifically, the Court stated, “The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred 
text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular 
purpose can blind us to that fact.”  Id.  The Court rejected Kentucky’s legislative purpose of 
displaying the Ten Commandments as a fundamental legal code.  Id.  The Court noted that 
the Ten Commandments are not limited to secular matters such as honoring parents, 
killing, adultery, stealing, lying, or coveting, but include religious duties of believers of 
worshipping God, not bowing down to idols, not taking the Lord’s name in vain, and 
observing the Sabbath.  Id. at 41-42. 
106 Id. at 42. 
107 Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2000).  Although all three religions 
adhere to the Ten Commandments, the three religions disagree on the numbering of the 
Ten Commandments.  Protestant churches number the Ten Commandments in the 
following manner: 
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1. You shall have no other gods before me. 
2. You shall not make for yourself an idol. 
3. You shall not misuse the name of the LORD your God. 
4. Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. 
5. Honor your father and your mother. 
6. You shall not murder. 
7. You shall not commit adultery. 
8. You shall not steal. 
9. You shall not give false testimony against your neighbor. 
10. You shall not covet. 
THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM, Question & Answer 92, reprinted in PSALTER HYMNAL 903-04 
(1987). 
 The Lutheran and Roman Catholic Churches combine the first two commandments 
and divide the commandment on coveting into two commandments.  2 FRED H. KLOOSTER, 
OUR ONLY COMFORT:  A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY ON THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM 925 
(2001).  The Ten Commandments for Lutherans and Catholics are numbered as follows: 
1. You shall worship the LORD your God and serve Him only. 
2. You shall not take the name of the LORD your God in vain. 
3. Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. 
4. Honor your father and your mother. 
5. You shall not murder. 
6. You shall not commit adultery. 
7. You shall not steal. 
8. You shall not give false testimony against your neighbor. 
9. You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife. 
10. You shall not covet your neighbor’s goods. 
LUTHER’S CATECHISM:  THE SMALL CATECHISM OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER AND AN EXPOSITION 
FOR CHILDREN AND ADULTS WRITTEN IN CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH 53-123 (1982); UNITED 
STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, INC., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH 561-672 (1995). 
 As their first commandment, Jews use a declaration of faith, and then combine the 
first two commandments for Protestants into one commandment.  ALAN. M. DERSHOWITZ, 
THE GENESIS OF JUSTICE: TEN STORIES OF BIBLICAL INJUSTICE THAT LED TO THE TEN 
COMMANDMENTS AND MODERN LAW 247-48 (2000).  The Ten Commandments for Jews are 
numbered as follows: 
1. I am the LORD your God. 
2. You shall have no other gods before me. 
3. You shall not swear. 
4. You shall honor the Sabbath. 
5. You shall honor your father and your mother. 
6. You shall not kill. 
7. You shall not commit adultery. 
8. You shall not steal. 
9. You shall not give false testimony. 
10. You shall not covet. 
11. You shall not swear. 
12. You shall honor the Sabbath. 
Id. at 247-52. 
 In lawsuits attacking public Ten Commandments displays, plaintiffs often argue that 
government is endorsing a religion because government has displayed the text of the Ten 
Commandments as adhered to by one religion.  See, e.g., ACLU Claims Opposition to Ten 
Commandments Display Over Concern for Catholics:  Catholic Group Rejects ACLU “Defense,” 
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been quick to overlook that the Ten Commandments are primarily a 
religious text.108  However, no court has been willing to say that posting 
the Ten Commandments cannot serve a secular purpose.109  Justice 
Stevens in Allegheny even provided a constitutional context in which the 
Ten Commandments could be publicly displayed.110  He stated that no 
message is more fitting for a courtroom than a display of Moses carrying 
the Ten Commandments, Mohammad, Confucius, Blackstone, Napoleon, 
and John Marshall.111  The Eleventh Circuit, in spring of 2003, found a 
                                                                                                             
LIFESITE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 2004, at http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2004/jan/04010907.html 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2004) (reporting that the ACLU is arguing that the Iowa government 
favored Christians over Jews, Catholics, and Lutherans because the Ten Commandments 
displayed in the Iowa Statehouse quotes the Ten Commandments from the King James 
Version).  This argument has been rejected by one court.  See ACLU v. Mercer County, 219 
F. Supp. 2d 777, 797 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (“The mere fact that the posted version may be more 
like a traditional Protestant version than the Catholic or Jewish versions does not mean that 
the posting of the Commandments favors one denomination or one religion over 
another.”). 
108 See Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 262 (3d Cir. 2003) (“As a 
preliminary matter, we cannot ignore the inherently religious message of the Ten 
Commandments.”); Books, 235 F.3d at 302 (“[W]e do not think it can be said that the Ten 
Commandments, standing by themselves, can be stripped of their religious, indeed sacred, 
significance and characterized as a moral or ethical document.”). 
109 See Freethought Soc’y, 334 F.3d at 262 (“[W]e do not believe that Stone holds that there 
can never be a secular purpose for posting the Ten Commandments, or that the Ten 
Commandments are so overwhelmingly religious in nature that they will always be seen 
only as an endorsement of religion.”); Books, 235 F.3d at 302 (“The text of the Ten 
Commandments no doubt has played a role in the secular development of our society and 
can no doubt be presented by the government as playing such a role in our civic order.”); 
Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 33 (10th Cir. 1973) (quoting one of plaintiff’s 
attorneys as saying, “[T]he Ten Commandments is an affirmation of at least a precedent 
legal code”).  But see Joseph R. Duncan, Jr., Privilege, Invisibility and Religion:  A Critique of 
the Privilege That Christianity Has Enjoyed in the United States, 54 ALA. L. REV. 617 (2003) 
(arguing that allowing the Ten Commandments to be posted in public offices under the 
assumption of it being a secular, historical document is an example of the privilege 
Christians have enjoyed since the foundation of the United States). 
110 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 652 (1989). 
111 Id.  Justice Stevens commented that a display of this kind signaled respect for great 
lawgivers.  Id. at 652-53.  Justice Stevens was referring to the frieze on the north and south 
walls of the Supreme Court courtroom.  The frieze was designed in 1931–1932 and includes 
a procession of “great lawgivers of history.”  OFFICE OF THE CURATOR, SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES, COURTROOM FRIEZES:  NORTH AND SOUTH WALLS (2002), 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/north&southwalls.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 
2004).  The procession includes Menes, Hammurabi, Moses, Solomon, Lycurgus, Solon, 
Draco, Confucius, Octavian, Justinian, Muhammad, Charlemagne, King John, Louis IX, 
Hugo Grotius, Sir William Blackstone, John Marshall, and Napoleon.  Id.  Moses in the 
frieze is holding two tablets, on which appear commandments six through ten in Hebrew.  
Id. 
 Moses also appears in the Supreme Court building on the East Pediment.  OFFICE OF 
THE CURATOR, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE EAST PEDIMENT (2002), 
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constitutional use of the Ten Commandments in King v. Richmond 
County.112  Since 1872, the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, 
had used as its seal a circle inscribed with two rectangular tablets with 
rounded tops.113  The court held that the county had articulated a secular 
purpose when it argued that the seal was adopted because the Ten 
Commandments were recognizable symbols of the law for its illiterate 
citizens.114  
C. The Circuits and the Ten Commandments 
In the past five years, the federal courts have experienced a dramatic 
increase in cases involving public Ten Commandments displays.115  
Because the Supreme Court has provided little guidance on Ten 
Commandments displays,116 the decisions by lower federal courts are 
often hard to reconcile as the courts have employed different reasonable 
observers.  The use of different reasonable observers is most visible by 
comparing the two decisions rendered by the Fifth Circuit and the 
Seventh Circuit regarding Fraternal Order of Eagles’ (“FOE”) 
                                                                                                             
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/eastpediment.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2004).  
On the east pediment, Moses is surrounded by Confucius and Solon and is holding two 
tablets.  Id.  In addition to the portrayals of Moses, tablets inscribed with the Roman 
numerals I-X are depicted in three locations in the Supreme Court building:  the support 
frame for the bronze gates; the interior panels of the Courtroom doors; and in the 
woodwork of the library.  OFFICE OF THE CURATOR, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
SYMBOLS OF LAW (2002), http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/symbolsoflaw.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2004). 
 The Senate office buildings contain no images of the Ten Commandments or of Moses.  
E-mail from Scott Strong, Office of Senate Curator, to Julie Van Groningen, Law Student, 
Valparaiso University School of Law (Oct. 20, 2003, 13:14:38) (on file with author).  The 
chamber of the House of Representatives contains a full-face bas relief of Moses.  THE 
ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITAL, RELIEF PORTRAITS OF LAWGIVERS (1993), available at 
http://www.aoc.gov/cc/art/lawgivers/lawgivers.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2004).  In 
addition to the plaque of Moses, the chambers of the House of Representatives also contain 
plaques of George Mason, Robert Joseph Potheir, Jean Baptiste Colbert, Edward I, Alfonso 
X, Gregory IX, Saint Louis, Justinian I, Tribonian, Lycurgus, Hammurabi, Solon, Papinian, 
Gaius, Suleiman, Innocent III, Simon de Montfort, Hugo Grotius, Sir William Blackstone, 
Napoleon, and Thomas Jefferson.  Id.  The plaque of Moses is hung over the gallery doors 
and the profiles of the other twenty-two men face Moses.  Id. 
112 331 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003). 
113 Id. at 1274.  Around the seal’s perimeter were the words “SUPERIOR COURT 
RICHMOND COUNTY.”  Id.  In the middle of the seal was a depiction of a hilt and the tip 
of a sword.  Id.  On the center of the hilt and sword were the two tablets.  Id.  The tablets 
contained the roman numerals I-X, but not the text of the Ten Commandments.  Id. 
114 Id. at 1277-78. 
115 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
116 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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monuments.117  The different reasonable observers are then exemplified 
by looking at the two Ten Commandments cases from the summer of 
2003 and the cases regarding modified displays.118 
1. The Cases Involving Fraternal Order of Eagles’ Monuments 
The use of different reasonable observers is seen by comparing the 
two decisions rendered by the Fifth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit 
regarding FOE monuments.119  In Books v. City of Elkhart,120 the plaintiffs 
                                                 
117 See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text. 
118 See infra notes 131-63 and accompanying text. 
119 See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 
292 (7th Cir. 2000).  See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text for a discussion on the 
reasonable observer employed by the two circuits.  Although the holdings are difficult to 
reconcile based on the courts’ analysis of the reasonable observer, the holdings are 
reconcilable on the purpose prong.  The Seventh Circuit held that the City of Elkhart did 
not have a secular purpose in displaying the monument, because it concluded that the city 
had wanted to impress a religious code of conduct on its citizens and because the city had 
elected to have a Protestant minister, a Catholic priest, and a Jewish rabbi speak at the 
dedication of the monument.  Books, 235 F.3d at 303.  The Fifth Circuit held that the state of 
Texas had a secular purpose—recognizing the FOE’s efforts in reducing juvenile 
delinquency—in accepting and erecting the statute.  Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 179. 
 The FOE donated more than four thousand Ten Commandments monuments 
throughout the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s to state and local governments.  Jacoby, supra note 12.  
In 1943, a Minnesota juvenile court judge, an FOE member, decided that he wanted to 
provide American youth with a code of conduct.  State v. Freedom from Religion Found., 
898 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Colo. 1995).  His original plan was to place copies of the Ten 
Commandments in state juvenile courts, and he brought this idea to his local FOE aerie for 
financial support.  Id.  At first, his aerie denied financial support because they believed the 
Ten Commandments might be perceived as coercive or sectarian.  Id.  However, after 
Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic representatives agreed on a non-sectarian version of the 
Ten Commandments, the FOE agreed to finance this project.  Id.  During the same period, 
Cecil B. DeMille was producing the movie “The Ten Commandments” and he called up the 
judge and suggested distributing the copies of the Ten Commandments to coincide with 
the release of his movie.  Id.  DeMille and the judge then agreed that because the original 
Ten Commandments were on granite, that the donated copies would also be on granite.  Id.  
Local FOE aeries, after paying for the manufacture of the monuments, donated them to 
their local governments.  Id. 
 The FOE monuments are six feet high and three and a half feet wide.  Van Orden, 351 
F.3d at 176.  The face of the monument is consumed with the text of the non-sectarian Ten 
Commandments.  Id.  Above the text are two small tablets containing ancient Hebrew 
script, and located between the tablets is an all-seeing eye within a pyramid.  Id.  Below the 
pyramid is an American eagle holding an American flag.  Id.  Beneath the text are two Stars 
of David and the Greek letters, Chi and Rho, superimposed upon each other, a symbol of 
Christ.  Id.  The monuments also contained plaques stating that they had been donated by 
the FOE.  Id.  For a picture of an FOE monument, see Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 
309 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 In 2002, the Tenth Circuit heard a challenge to a 1966 FOE Ten Commandments 
monument donated to the City of Ogden, Utah.  Summan v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 
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challenged the constitutionality of a 1958 FOE-donated Ten 
Commandments monument that sat on the front lawn of Elkhart’s 
municipal building.121  The Seventh Circuit held that the monument 
conveyed a message of endorsement to the reasonable observer.122  The 
                                                                                                             
(10th Cir. 2002).  Because of a prior decision in 1973, the court was forced to take a different 
route other than declaring the monument constitutional or unconstitutional.  Id.  In 1973, 
the Tenth Circuit had declared an FOE monument constitutional because it was a passive 
display that depicted a historically important document that had secular effects.  Anderson 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 33-34 (10th Cir. 1973).  In 2002, adherents of the 
Summan religion petitioned Ogden to place a monument with its Seven Principles next to 
the FOE monument.  Summan, 297 F.3d at 998.  Upon appeal from the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment for Ogden, the Tenth Circuit, in 2002, stated it could not overrule 
Anderson and declare an FOE monument unconstitutional absent an en banc hearing.  Id. at 
999-1000.  Instead, the Tenth Circuit decided the case based on the Free Exercise Clause and 
held that Ogden had established a non-public forum when it accepted the FOE monument.  
Id. at 1002.  In addition, the court held that Ogden had engaged in unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination when it refused to accept the Summan monument.  Id. at 1011. 
 This decision held grave implications for the City of Casper, Wyoming.  See Wyoming 
City Council Moves Ten Commandments, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 29, 2003, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,101546,00.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2004).  
Because an FOE monument stood in a public park, the Rev. Phelps petitioned Casper to 
allow him to place a monument stating that Matthew Shepard, a young, gay man 
murdered in 1998, went to hell because of his sexual orientation.  Id.  Rev. Phelps 
threatened to sue Casper, based on Summan, if it refused to permit his monument in the 
park.  Id.  As a result, Casper, to avoid litigation, moved the FOE monument to a plaza 
honoring historical documents.  Id. 
120 235 F.3d 292. 
121 Id. at 295.  Also located on the twenty-five foot lawn were a Revolutionary War 
Monument and a Freedom Monument.  Id.  The Ten Commandments monument and the 
Revolutionary War Monument were located approximately the same distance from the 
entrance of the municipal building and from the sidewalk.  Id. at 296 n.3.  The city did not 
provide any maintenance to any of the three monuments.  Id. at 295. 
122 Id. at 307.  In the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined 
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote a dissenting opinion.  City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 
U.S. 1058, 1059 (2001).  The Chief Justice disagreed with the Seventh Circuit’s opinion and 
stated that the primary effect of the monument was not to endorse religion.  Id. at 1062-63.  
He reasoned that because the monument was located on the front lawn of the Municipal 
Building that the secular significance of the Ten Commandments in establishing American 
law was emphasized.  Id.  He further reasoned that the secular significance was 
emphasized because the two other monuments celebrated the city’s history.  Id. 
 Compare Books, 235 F.3d at 292, with Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1013.  In 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, an FOE monument was placed in Lincoln Park, a state-
owned park across the street from the Colorado State Capital Building.  898 P.2d at 1015.  
Lincoln Park and the State Capital Building were both located in a three-block area called 
the Capital Complex Grounds.  Id.  At least fifteen other monuments were located 
throughout the Capital Grounds, and the closest monument to the FOE monument was 
over thirty-feet away.  Id. at 1015-16.  The court held that a reasonable observer would not 
see the FOE monument as an endorsement of religion because the monument did not stand 
alone in Lincoln Park, rather, it was in the vicinity of larger monuments.  Id. at 1025.  The 
court further reasoned that the FOE monument did not endorse religion because the other 
Van Groningen: Thou Shalt Reasonably Focus on Its Context:  Analyzing Public Dis
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
248 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
court reasoned that any passerby or any individual approaching the 
municipal building would not view the FOE monument along with the 
other two monuments on the lawn as being a comprehensive display of 
the cultural heritage of Elkhart.123  The court reached this holding 
because the monument was located on the lawn at the seat of the city 
government, and because the format of the display did nothing to dilute 
its religious message.124 
Unlike the reasonable observer in Books, who only has knowledge 
about what he or she can see, the reasonable observer in Van Orden v. 
Perry125 is informed and is able to form conclusions using information 
not gleaned from looking at the monument.126  In Van Orden, the plaintiff 
challenged a 1961 FOE-donated Ten Commandments monument located 
on the State Capital Grounds in Texas.127  The court concluded that a 
reasonable observer would not perceive endorsement because a 
reasonable observer would be aware that sixteen other monuments were 
located on the Capital Grounds and that all the monuments described 
the Texan identity.128  The court also noted that the reasonable observer 
                                                                                                             
monuments in Lincoln Park also commemorated the history of the United States and 
Colorado.  Id.  Furthermore, the court reasoned that the display did not have a coercive 
effect on any viewer because it was located in an inconspicuous place where persons 
would only go by choice.  Id. 
123 Books, 235 F.3d at 306.  The court focused on what a passerby would see even though it 
had previously stated that the reasonable observer is one “familiar with the history and 
placement of the Ten Commandments monument.”  Id. 
124 Id.  The court reasoned that even though the monument contained symbols of Judaism 
and Christianity the monument violated the Establishment Clause because Judaism and 
Christianity were not the only religions in Elkhart.  Id.  The court also reasoned that 
because the monument showed the American eagle gripping the flag, that the monument 
unconstitutionally linked government with Judaism and Christianity.  Id. at 307.  Contra 
Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1023 (reasoning that the integration of the Star of 
David and the symbol of Christ acknowledged diversity and reconciliation between 
Judaism and Christianity, not intolerance of other religions). 
125 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003). 
126 See id. at 178.  The court stated, “This is the observation of a reasonable observer, not 
of the uninformed, the casual passerby, the heckler, or the reaction of a single individual.”  
Id. at 177-78. 
127 Id. at 175-76.  The State Capital Grounds in Texas consisted of twenty-two acres, on 
which sits seventeen monuments.  Id. at 175.  The other sixteen monuments included a 
memorial to Texas children, a tribute to Texas women, a memorial to Pearl Harbor 
veterans, a replica of the Statute of Liberty, a memorial to Korean War veterans, a memorial 
to the World War I veterans, Van Orden v. Perry, No. A-01-CA-833-H, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26709, at *5 n.5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2002), aff’d, 351 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 2003), and a 
memorial to the Alamo soldiers.  Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 175.  The State Capital Grounds 
had previously been designated as a national Historic Landmark that was dedicated to 
displaying monuments showcasing the Texan identity.  Id. 
128 Id. at 182. 
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would know that the monument had stood for forty-two years without 
being challenged.129  In addition, the court stated that a reasonable 
observer would know that the monument was located directly between 
the legislative chambers, the office of the governor, and the Supreme 
Court Building, and would know that the Ten Commandments have 
influenced law-making bodies.130 
2. The Two Cases from Summer 2003 
During the summer of 2003, the Third Circuit and the Eleventh 
Circuit handed down opinions regarding the constitutionality of Ten 
Commandments displays located at courthouses.131  Although the Third 
Circuit declared the display constitutional and the Eleventh Circuit 
declared the display unconstitutional, the two holdings are consistent as 
each court imputed substantial knowledge to the reasonable observer.132 
In Freethought Society v. Chester County,133 the Third Circuit held that 
a Ten Commandments plaque, which had been affixed to the façade of 
the Chester County courthouse for the past eighty years, did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.134  In holding that a reasonable observer 
                                                 
129 Id. at 181-82.  The court noted the age of the monument lessened the inference to a 
reasonable observer that the state acted with an improper purpose.  Id. at 182. 
130 Id. at 181.  In concluding, the court stated: 
[W]e disserve no constitutional principle by concluding that a State’s 
display of the decalogue in a manner that honors its secular strength is 
not inevitably an impermissible endorsement of its religious message 
in the eyes of our reasonable observer.  To say otherwise retreats from 
the objective test of an informed person to the heckler’s veto of the 
unreasonable or ill-informed—replacing the sense of proportion and fit 
with uncompromising rigidity at a costly price to the values of the First 
Amendment. 
Id. at 182. 
131 See Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 72 U.S.L.W. 3309 
(U.S. Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 03-468); Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
132 See Gary Young, Thou Shalt, and Thou Shalt Not:  Two Courts Give Two Very Different 
Rulings on Ten Commandments Displays, 25 NAT’L L.J. 7 (July 14, 2003).  Young quoted 
Professor Douglas Laycock who stated that he was “absolutely certain” that the Third 
Circuit would have ruled the same way as the Eleventh Circuit had it had been presented 
with the same set of facts.  Id. 
133 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003). 
134 Id. at 250-51.  The plaque, donated to the courthouse in 1920 by the Religious 
Education Council, was affixed to the facade next to the main entrance.  Id. at 249-50.  
However, that entrance was closed a few years before the lawsuit and since then visitors 
have entered the courthouse seventy feet to the north.  Id.  Since receiving the plaque, the 
county did nothing to maintain its appearance.  Id. at 250.  The suit was brought by a 
Chester County resident who had noticed the plaque in 1960 but who was not bothered by 
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would not conclude that the county was endorsing religion, the court 
assumed that the reasonable observer would be informed about the 
approximate age of the plaque, would know that the county provided no 
maintenance to the plaque, and would be informed about the general 
history of the county.135  Armed with this knowledge, the reasonable 
observer, the court concluded, would view the plaque as part of the 
history of Chester County.136    
In the second Ten Commandments case decided in the summer of 
2003, the Eleventh Circuit, in Glassroth v. Moore,137 declared a two and 
one-half ton monument bearing the Ten Commandments, which had 
been placed in the rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building by 
Judge Roy Moore, unconstitutional.138  The court held the monument 
conveyed a message of endorsement to the reasonable observer.139  The 
                                                                                                             
it until 2001.  Id.  Freethought Society, “a forum for atheists, agnostics, freethinkers to meet, 
socialize and exchange ideas,” brought the suit on the citizen’s behalf.  Id. 
 The court used the Lemon Test to analyze the plaque’s constitutionality and used the 
Endorsement Test to analyze the effects prong.  Id. at 261-69.  In determining the purpose of 
the plaque, the court looked at the purpose of the county commissioners who refused to 
take down the plaque in 2001 and not at the purpose of the government in accepting the 
plaque in 1920.  Id. at 267.  The court held that the commissioners had a legitimate secular 
purpose in keeping the plaque on the façade because the commissioners believed the 
plaque symbolized how faith and reason worked together in creating the United States.  Id. 
 In using the Endorsement Test, the court expressly adopted Justice O’Connor’s 
reasonable observer.  Id. at 259.  The court stated, “[A] reasonable observer must be 
presumed to have an understanding of the general history of the display and the 
community in which it is displayed; the reasonable observer is more knowledgeable than 
the uninformed passerby.”  Id. 
135 Id. at 260.  Although the court did not impute the reasonable observer with knowledge 
of the exact age of the plaque, but only with knowledge that the plaque had been affixed to 
the courthouse for a long time, the reasonable observer used this knowledge in 
determining the purpose of the plaque.  Id. at 265.  The court stated: 
The reasonable observer would perceive an historic plaque as less of 
an endorsement of religion than a more recent religious display not 
because the Ten Commandments have lost their religious significance, 
but because the maintenance of this plaque sends a much different 
message about the religious views of the County . . . . The reasonable 
observer, knowing the age of the . . . plaque, would regard the decision 
to leave it in place as motivated, in significant part, by the desire to 
preserve a longstanding plaque. 
Id. 
136 Id. 
137 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 72 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 03-
468). 
138 Id. at 1284. 
139 Id. at 1297.  In its analysis, the court applied the Lemon Test, and it found that no 
secular purpose existed for displaying the Ten Commandments monument because Judge 
Moore repeatedly said his purpose in displaying the monument was to “acknowledge the 
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reasonable observer, the court noted, would know that Judge Moore had 
campaigned under the slogan “Ten Commandments Judge,” that Judge 
Moore had placed the monument in the rotunda to keep his campaign 
promise of restoring the moral foundation of the law, and that the 
rotunda was not a public forum where other groups could place 
displays.140 
3. The Modified Displays 
In addition to the holdings in Glassroth and Books,141 the majority of 
public Ten Commandments displays have been declared 
unconstitutional.142  Because of this, local government officials, 
attempting to comply with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Lynch and 
Allegheny,143 have put the Ten Commandments in a setting that attempts 
to negate their religious nature.144  This effort has not always saved FOE 
                                                                                                             
law and sovereignty of the God of the Holy Scriptures, and that it was intended to 
acknowledge ‘God’s overruling power over the affairs of men.’”  Id. at 1296. 
140 Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2002), aff’d, 335 F.3d 1282 
(11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 72 U.S.L.W. 3309 (No. 03-468).  The court limited the reasonable 
observer’s knowledge by stating that the reasonable observer would not know about Judge 
Moore’s relationship with Coral Ridge Ministries, his numerous speeches, or his television 
and radio appearances over the past two years.  Id. 
141 See supra notes 120-24, 137-40 and accompanying text. 
142 See ACLU v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a poster displaying 
the Ten Commandments in a courtroom was unconstitutional); Mercier v. City of La 
Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (holding an FOE monument located in a city 
park most likely created the perception of endorsement); ACLU v. Hamilton County, 202 F. 
Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) (declaring a plaque of the Ten Commandments hanging 
alone in a courtroom unconstitutional); Kimbley v. Lawrence County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856 
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (prohibiting the county from erecting and maintaining a Ten 
Commandments monument); Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993), 
aff’d, 15 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a framed copy of the Ten Commandments 
in a courtroom by itself violates the Establishment Clause).  But see Suhre v. Haywood 
County, 55 F. Supp. 2d 384 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (holding a Ten Commandments plaque in a 
county courtroom constitutional). 
143 See supra notes 33-48, 55-70 and accompanying text. 
144 See Noel E. Oman, Jefferson, Hammurabi Join Commandments:  Maumelle Court Adds 
Words as Deterrent, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 11, 2003, available at 2003 WL 62520122 
(stating that Maumelle District Court Judge David Pake added the words of Thomas 
Jefferson, Hammurabi, Justinian, Blackstone, and Confucius to his courtroom display of the 
Ten Commandments).  However, not all judges believe a context like this makes a Ten 
Commandments display constitutional.  See Shirley Ragsdale, State Court Rejects Gift of Ten 
Commandments, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 18, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 64150747 
(reporting that Iowa Supreme Court Officials turned down a donation of ten historic 
plaques because one of the plaques contained the Ten Commandments). 
 Local governments, to protect themselves against lawsuits, have also moved Ten 
Commandments displays to private property or have sold the land the display is located 
on to a private party.  See Jacoby, supra note 12 (reporting that the ACLU dropped its 
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monuments or other Ten Commandments displays as many of these 
courts employed an uninformed reasonable observer standard.145 
In Adland v. Russ,146 the Kentucky legislature adopted a provision to 
relocate a 1971 FOE-donated Ten Commandments monument from its 
current spot on the Capital Grounds, where it had sat for three decades, 
to a new site near the Floral Clock to become part of a historical and 
cultural display.147  The Sixth Circuit declared the display 
unconstitutional and began its reasoning by stating that the prominent 
placement of the monument would send the unmistakable message that 
Kentucky endorses the Ten Commandments.148  The court also held that 
a reasonable observer would not be able to identify a unifying theme 
between all the monuments and markers.149  Because a reasonable 
                                                                                                             
lawsuit alleging the unconstitutionality of an FOE monument against the City of Frederick, 
Maryland, when the city sold the “sliver of land” the monument rested on to a private 
party); Mark Wiebe, Commission Decides to Move Ten Commandments off Courthouse Lawn, 
KANSAS CITY STAR, July 23, 2003, available at 2003 WL 57903678 (reporting that the Unified 
Board of Commissioners of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas, agreed to move 
an FOE monument from the courthouse lawn to a church lawn to drop a threatened 
lawsuit by the ACLU).  However, this approach has not been successful in the courts.  After 
a lawsuit was filed against the City of La Crosse, Wisconsin, for displaying an FOE 
monument in a city park, the city sold the monument and the 20’ x 22’ parcel of land it sat 
on to the FOE.  Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.  The court held that the sale violated the 
Establishment Clause because the city gave preferential treatment to the FOE’s religious 
message over all other messages.  Id. at 1011. 
145 See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text. 
146 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002). 
147 Id. at 474-75.  The Floral Clock, thirty-four feet in diameter and weighing 200,000 
pounds, was located in a prominent place on the Capital Grounds and could be seen from 
the circular drive leading to the public parking lot.  Id. at 477.  The historical and cultural 
display also included a Kentucky Historical Society memorial sign, a “Welcome to 
Kentucky” plaque, a marker memorializing Kentucky POWS, and markers 
commemorating an author/journalist, a former governor, a former physical plant director, 
and a former cabinet member.  Id. 
148 Id. at 486.  The court also held that Kentucky lacked a secular purpose in erecting the 
historical and cultural display because Section 8 of the Resolution, which directed the 
display to be erected, did not delineate the specific components of the display other than 
the Ten Commandments.  Id. at 477, 481.  The court concluded this meant that the other 
components of the display were secondary in importance to the Ten Commandments.  Id. 
at 481.  This conclusion was bolstered, the court noted, by the fact the FOE monument 
physically dwarfed the other seven monuments.  Id. at 482. 
149 Id. at 488.  Additionally, the court held that nothing on the monument depleted the 
religious message of the Ten Commandments.  Id. at 486-87.  The court agreed with the 
Seventh Circuit that the linking of religious and secular symbols created an impermissible 
link between religion and government.  Id. 
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observer could not identify a unifying theme, the court reasoned that a 
reasonable observer would focus on the monuments separately.150  
A reasonable observer also could not identify a unifying theme in 
Indiana Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon.151  After an FOE monument 
donated to the state of Indiana was smashed in 1991, an Indiana state 
representative arranged to have a new monument built, one inscribed 
with the text of the Ten Commandments, the Bill of Rights, and the 
Preamble of the Indiana Constitution.152  The monument was to be 
placed in the two-acre park grounds around the capital alongside other 
monuments.153  The Seventh Circuit held that the primary effect of the 
new monument would be an endorsement of religion.154  The court 
reached this conclusion because the monument sat on government 
property and a reasonable person would think that the monument 
occupied its position with the government’s approval.155  Furthermore, 
the court noted that a viewer, when coming from certain directions, 
would only be able to see the Ten Commandments and not the other 
texts; therefore, the court reasoned that a reasonable observer would be 
unable to make any connection between the three texts.156 
The same reasonable observer who could not identify a unifying 
theme in Adland and O’Bannon could not identify one in ACLU v. 
McCreary County.157  In McCreary County, two counties and a school 
district erected “Foundations of American Law and Government” 
displays.158  Before these displays were erected, the two counties and the 
                                                 
150 Id. 
151 259 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2001). 
152 Id. at 768. 
153 Id. at 769.  The other monuments included two monuments honoring the civil 
engineering of the National Road, a monument honoring Indiana women, two monuments 
depicting Civil War scenes, a monument describing the capital’s history, and statues of 
Christopher Columbus, George Washington, a coal miner, and two Indiana governors.  Id. 
154 Id. at 772.  The court also held that the State of Indiana had not articulated any secular 
purpose.  Id.  The court analyzed a press release issued by Indiana Governor O’Brien in 
which he stated that the Ten Commandments would serve as a reminder of the nation’s 
core values.  Id. at 771.  The court rejected this argument because the Ten Commandments, 
it reasoned, only served as a reminder of core values for those who adhere to the Ten 
Commandments.  Id.  
155 Id. at 772. 
156 Id. at 773.  The court further reasoned that if a reasonable observer would be able to 
make a connection between the three texts, it would be one of religion, not one of history.  
Id. 
157 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003). 
158 Id. at 443.  The displays included the texts of the Ten Commandments, the Magna 
Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the Star-Spangled Banner, the 
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school district had attempted to display the Ten Commandments in two 
other settings.159  The Sixth Circuit held that the present amended 
displays most likely violated the Establishment Clause.160  The court first 
reasoned that a reasonable observer would not be able to identify a 
unifying theme between all the documents.161  Second, the court 
reasoned a reasonable observer would perceive endorsement because the 
locations of the displays, two courthouses and a public school, were 
                                                                                                             
Mayflower Compact, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, the symbol of Lady 
Justice, and the National Motto of the United States.  Id. 
159 Id. at 441-42.  In 1999, the counties and the school district erected framed copies of the 
Ten Commandments.  Id. at 441.  After lawsuits were filed against them, the counties and 
the school district amended the displays to include excerpts from the Declaration of 
Independence, the Preamble of the Kentucky Constitution, and the Mayflower Compact.  
The displays also included statements from the Congressional Record declaring 1983 the 
Year of the Bible, statements from President Lincoln declaring April 30, 1863, to be a day of 
prayer and humiliation and stating “[t]he Bible is the best gift God has ever given to man,” 
and statements from Ronald Reagan declaring 1983 to be the Year of the Bible.  Id. at 442.  
The plaintiffs were granted a preliminary injunction, and the counties and the school 
district were ordered to remove the displays.  Id.  The counties and the school district then 
erected the “Foundations of American Law and Government Display.”  Id. at 443. 
160 Id. at 462.  The court issued a preliminary injunction finding that the plaintiffs 
demonstrated a likelihood of succeeding on the merits.  Id. 
161 Id. at 460.  The court noted that all the documents, save the Ten Commandments, are 
related to Western European or American culture since the year 1215.  Id.  The court also 
stated that the problem of a reasonable observer not knowing the connection between all 
the documents as foundations of American law could not be overcome by the counties 
merely asserting it.  Id.; see also Turner v. Habersham County, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. 
Ga. 2003).  In Turner, the county displayed the Ten Commandments alongside the 
Declaration of Independence, the Mayflower Compact, the Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta, 
the National Anthem, and Lady Justice.  Turner, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.  In declaring the 
display unconstitutional, the court explained a reasonable observer, even a reasonable 
observer familiar with all the documents, would be unable to explain the connection 
between the documents.  Id. at 1372.  Contra ACLU v. Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d 
799 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).  In Rutherford County, the county also erected a “Foundations of 
American Law and Government” display.  Id. at 803.  This display included the Mayflower 
Compact, the Declaration of Independence, the Ten Commandments, the Magna Carta, the 
lyrics of The Star-Spangled Banner, the Preamble to the Tennessee Constitution, the Bill of 
Rights, and a picture of Lady Justice.  Id. at 803-04.  The county included an explanation of 
each document’s significance.  Id. at 803.  Although the court noted that the documents, 
except the Ten Commandments, were patriotic in nature, the court held the effect was not 
endorsement because the context as a whole conveyed a secular message of patriotism to 
the reasonable observer.  Id. at 811-12.  However, the court did note that the county had 
probably not chosen “the most impressive examples” of United States legal history.  Id. at 
812.  According to the court, quotes from Confucius, Muhammad, King John, Louis IX, 
John Marshall, Hammurabi, Justinian, and Napoleon may have provided a “more 
thoughtfully-constructed display.”  Id.  Although a reasonable observer would not perceive 
endorsement, the court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction because the county 
lacked a secular purpose in erecting the display.  Id. at 813. 
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under government control.162  Third, a reasonable observer would 
perceive endorsement because of the history of the displays; a reasonable 
observer, the court stated, would be aware of the previous displays and 
would know that the controversy surrounding the displays focused only 
on the Ten Commandments.163 
4. The Ten Commandments Originally as Part of a Historical Display 
Despite the above rulings and the use of an uninformed reasonable 
observer by several courts, the ACLU will not challenge the 
constitutionality of all public Ten Commandments displays when the 
Ten Commandments are portrayed as a historical document alongside 
other historical legal documents.164  In 2000, the ACLU challenged an 
FOE monument donated to Custer County, Montana.165  The ACLU 
agreed to drop its legal challenge if the county agreed to erect an 
“Evolution of Law” display.166  The ACLU further agreed that the Ten 
                                                 
162 McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 460-61.  Contra Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 812 
(reasoning that the location of a courthouse “where justice is administered . . . and local 
government is seated” emphasizes the secular role of the Ten Commandments). 
163 McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 461. 
164 See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text; see also Christopher Sherman, ACLU 
Won’t Fight Monument; the “Rock” in Polk’s Administration Building Includes More Than the 
Ten Commandments, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 2003, at B3, available at 2003 WL 64970722 
(reporting that the ACLU will not challenge the constitutionality of the “Foundation Rock” 
in Polk County, Florida, and quoting Howard Simon, executive director of the ACLU of 
Florida as saying, “Context is everything”).  In addition to the Ten Commandments, 
Hammurabi’s Code, the Magna Carta, the Mayflower Compact, writings of John Adams, 
the preamble to the Florida Constitution, and twelve of the twenty-five declarations of 
rights are inscribed on the “Foundation Rock.”  Christopher Sherman, Enthusiastic Crowd 
Greets Monument a Rock with the Ten Commandments in Polk Sparked Few Protests, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2003, at B1, available at 2003 WL 63278911.  In addition, the “Foundation 
Rock” is dominated by a four hundred pound bronze replica of the Liberty Bell.  Id.; cf. 
Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp.  669 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d, 15 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(granting a four month stay to Cobb County to make an unconstitutional display of the Ten 
Commandments constitutional by hanging non-religious, historical items near the Ten 
Commandments). 
165 Mary Zeiss Stange, Commentary; Moment to an Inglorious Past; Another Rendition of the 
Ten Commandments Finds a Fitting Home, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2003, at B13, available at 2003 
WL 2430025. 
166 Consent Agreement, ACLU v. Custer County, (No. DV 99-21843), http://archive.aclu. 
org/court/custer_consent.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2004).  The “Evolution of Law” 
display included the Ten Commandments, the Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta, the English 
Bill of Rights, and the Montana Constitution.  Id.  However, three years after agreement 
was reached by the ACLU and Custer County, the county had not erected the other four 
monuments.  Stange, supra note 165.  After the ACLU complained, the county elected to 
move the Ten Commandments monument to a museum.  Id. 
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Commandments display, when placed in the context of a historical 
display, would not have the effect of endorsing religion.167 
The FOE cases, along with the two cases from the summer of 2003 
and the modified display cases, demonstrate that the courts have not 
applied the same “reasonable observer” standard in analyzing Ten 
Commandments displays.  This failure to apply the same standard has 
led to inconsistent results:  FOE monuments, despite being uniform in 
appearance, have been declared both unconstitutional and 
constitutional;168 the location of a Ten Commandments monument next 
to a legal building may enhance the historical significance of the Ten 
Commandments or it may enhance the message of endorsement;169 and a 
reasonable observer, when viewing a “Foundations of American Law” 
display, may see nine historical documents or eight historical documents 
and one religious document.170  These inconsistent decisions are a result 
of the courts misapplying the reasonable person standard as articulated 
by Justice O’Connor.  
IV.  AN ANALYSIS OF THE REASONABLE OBSERVER STANDARD 
In using the “reasonable observer” standard, most courts have 
declared public displays of the Ten Commandments unconstitutional 
because the displays conveyed a message of endorsement to the 
reasonable observer.171  However, the reasonable observer used by those 
                                                 
167 Consent Agreement, Custer County (No. DV 99-21843). 
168 See supra text accompanying notes 119-30. 
169 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
170 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra text accompanying notes 120-24, 137-40, 142, 149-63.  Many of these same 
courts have also declared the Ten Commandments displays unconstitutional because 
government lacked a secular purpose in erecting the display.  See supra notes 129, 134, 148, 
154.  Government, in articulating a secular purpose for displaying the Ten 
Commandments, must remember that no court has denied the influence of the Ten 
Commandments on American law.  See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (stating that 
the Ten Commandments may be appropriate in public schools in a study of history); Van 
Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 181  (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that no one can deny the influence 
of the Ten Commandments on American civil and criminal law); cf. Initial Brief of 
Appellants at 20-29, ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-5935) 
(describing how each of the Ten Commandments was adopted into American law); 
Affidavit of David Barton in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Contempt, or, in the Alternative, for Supplemental Preliminary Injunction, ACLU v. 
McCreary County 145 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (No. 99-507), http://www.lc.org/ 
hotissues/attachments/Affidavit%20-%20David%20Barton%20re%20impact%20of%20ten 
%20commandments-%20McCreary.pdf (describing, in thirty-seven pages, how each one of 
the Ten Commandments has become deeply entrenched into American law); supra note 115 
(describing pictures of the Ten Commandments and Moses throughout the United States’ 
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courts is not always the same reasonable observer used by Justice 
O’Connor or by other federal courts.172  The cases discussed in Part III of 
this Note indicate that four different types of Ten Commandments 
monuments or displays exist.173  Part IV of this Note will portray at least 
one problem associated with each type of display that demonstrates the 
inadequacies of the reasonable observer standard as applied by courts or 
as articulated by Justice O’Connor.  Part IV.A will address the Ten 
Commandments originally as part of a historical display.174  Part IV.B 
will discuss the Ten Commandments as an already existing stand-alone 
display.175  Part IV.C will address the Ten Commandments as part of a 
historical display after having once been a stand-alone display.176  Part 
IV.D will analyze the Ten Commandments as a new stand-alone 
display.177    
A. The Ten Commandments Originally as Part of a Historical Display 
Although no court has ruled on the constitutionality of the Ten 
Commandments originally displayed as part of a historical display, these 
                                                                                                             
Capital Buildings).  But see Steven K. Green, The Fount of Everything Just and Right?  The Ten 
Commandments as a Source of American Law, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 525 (1999-2000) (arguing that 
the only connection between American law and the Ten Commandments is that the Ten 
Commandments influenced legal concepts of right and wrong).  Therefore, if government 
displays the Ten Commandments with the secular purpose of acknowledging the historical 
basis of American law, then government has articulated a secular purpose for displaying 
the Ten Commandments. Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (holding that the 
city’s primary purpose of displaying the crèche was not to advance religion even though 
religion received an “indirect, remote and incidental” benefit). 
172 See supra notes 89-94, 120-24, 146-63 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra Part III. 
174 See infra Part IV.A.  For a case and articles addressing the Ten Commandments as 
originally part of a historical display, see ACLU v. Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d 799 
(M.D. Tenn. 2002); supra note 168. 
175 See infra Part IV.B.  For cases involving the Ten Commandments as an already existing 
stand-alone display, see Van Orden, 351 F.3d 173; Freethought Society v. Chester County, 334 
F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000); State v. Freedom 
from Religion Foundation, 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995). 
176 See infra Part IV.C.  For cases involving the Ten Commandments as part of a historical 
display after originally being a stand-alone display, see ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 
438 (6th Cir. 2003); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002). 
177 See infra Part IV.D.  For a case involving the Ten Commandments as a new stand-
alone display, see Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).  For Part IV of this 
Note, a stand-alone display means any monument containing the Ten Commandments, 
which was not erected as part of a historical display, but it may be part of a museum 
setting containing other monuments. 
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are the displays that the courts will most likely find constitutional.178  
Nevertheless, problems the government will face in defending these 
displays can be articulated. 
First, opponents to the display will argue that the display equates 
the Ten Commandments with important historical documents.  For 
example, the court in McCreary County held that a reasonable observer 
when viewing the “Foundations of American Law and Government” 
display would see one religious document, the Ten Commandments, 
surrounded by eight political documents and would conclude that the 
Ten Commandments were “on a par” with the political documents.179  
But this reasoning does not comport with the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in either Lynch or Allegheny; in both decisions the Court held that the 
context of the display changes the message received by the viewer.180  
Therefore, under Lynch and Allegheny, a reasonable observer, when 
viewing the Ten Commandments as part of a historical display, would 
not view all of the documents separately and place them into categories 
of historical documents and religious documents; but rather, the 
reasonable observer would only see historical documents that were 
important to the foundation of American law because the context of the 
Ten Commandments, being surrounded by historical documents, 
negated the religious nature of the Ten Commandments.181 
Second, opponents to the display will argue that the government 
failed to include the necessary documents needed to negate the religious 
message of the Ten Commandments.  For example, the court in 
Rutherford County, although holding that a reasonable observer would 
not conclude endorsement from its “Foundation of American Law and 
Government” display, hinted that the county may not have chosen the 
best documents to include in the display.182  This argument also finds no 
merit in Lynch or Allegheny.  In deciding which holiday displays violated 
the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court has never stated the 
proposition that the constitutionality of a holiday display depends on 
                                                 
178 See supra notes 162, 164 (explaining that the ACLU agreed to not challenge the 
“Foundation Rock” or the Custer County FOE monument).  The display in Rutherford 
County only granted a preliminary injunction.  Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 800. 
179 See supra notes 158, 161 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra notes 37-38, 47, 48, 62, 66-68 and accompanying text. 
181 Cf. supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that the setting negated the 
religious message of the crèche because everything in the holiday display celebrated a 
public holiday). 
182 See supra note 161. 
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exactly what figures or signs are included in the display.183  The displays 
in Lynch and Allegheny that the Court found constitutional were 
significantly different from each other:  the display in Lynch consisted of 
a crèche, a Christmas tree, reindeer, carolers, and many other secular 
figures, whereas the display in Allegheny consisted only of a menorah, a 
Christmas tree, and a sign.184   
From these two decisions, it becomes apparent that the 
constitutionality of a holiday display does not depend on the particular 
contents of the display, but rather on whether the contents change the 
context of the religious symbol.  However, a holiday display is different 
than a Ten Commandments display:  a holiday display is erected for 
only a month or two each year, whereas a Ten Commandments display 
is a permanent display.185  Nonetheless, the same reasoning for holiday 
displays should apply to historical displays because although the 
historical display is permanent, its context has permanently negated the 
religious nature of the Ten Commandments in that display.186  Therefore, 
the constitutionality of a historical display that includes the Ten 
Commandments should not depend on whether the governmental entity 
included certain documents, but on whether the included documents 
negate the religious nature of the Ten Commandments.  
B. The Ten Commandments as an Already Existing Stand-Alone Display 
Ten Commandments displays that have existed for many years raise 
the issue of what determines the context of the contested display.  In two 
of her concurring opinions developing the reasonable observer, Justice 
O’Connor enunciated two guidelines in determining the context of the 
display.187  First, she stated that factors in determining the context of a 
                                                 
183 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Every 
government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it 
constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.”). 
184 See supra text accompanying notes 34, 56. 
185 See, e.g., ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1438 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that Jersey City 
displayed its crèche on the days immediately before and after Christmas and its menorah 
on the nine days of Hanukkah); Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 251 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (stating that the Ten Commandments plaque had been affixed to the façade of 
the courthouse since 1920). 
186 In addition, when analyzing public Ten Commandments displays, courts have not 
made a distinction between the temporary nature of holiday displays and the permanent 
nature of Ten Commandments displays.  See, e.g., Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 484-90 (6th 
Cir. 2002); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 304-07 (7th Cir. 2000). 
187 See supra notes 54, 76 and accompanying text. 
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statute are its text, legislative history, and implementation.188  Second, 
she declared that the history of the government land provided as much 
of the display’s context as did its location on government property.189   
In addition to these factors, lower courts have held that the history of 
the display is also part of its context.190  For example, the Third Circuit in 
Freethought Society held that the history of the Ten Commandments 
plaque, that it had been affixed to the courthouse facade for eighty years, 
was part of the plaque’s context.191  Allowing the history of the contested 
display to be part of the context would alleviate Justice Kennedy’s 
concern that the Endorsement Test would invalidate many traditional 
practices.192  For example, if a person concluded endorsement after 
hearing a President’s Thanksgiving Proclamation, that person would not 
succeed in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Proclamation 
because that person would know that all Presidents, starting with 
George Washington, have issued religious Thanksgiving 
Proclamations.193   
Allowing the history of the display to be part of its context re-
enforces the idea that the purpose of the Establishment Clause is to 
prohibit government from making religion relevant to political life, 
rather than from prohibiting acknowledgements of religion that merely 
make people feel uncomfortable.194  Many of the FOE monuments 
existed for forty years before their constitutionality was challenged and 
the plaque on the Chester County courthouse had been affixed to the 
courthouse facade for eighty years.195  Although these long-standing 
monuments may bring discomfort to atheists, Muslims, or Hindus,196 the 
monuments are not completely religious in nature because they have 
gained civic significance,197 and this civic significance should be 
                                                 
188 See supra text accompanying note 54. 
189 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
190 See supra notes 89, 135. 
191 Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 260 n.10 (3d Cir. 2003). 
192 See supra note 58. 
193 See supra note 58. 
194 See supra note 46. 
195 See supra text accompanying notes 121, 127, 134. 
196 See supra note 73 (explaining that government has not made religion relevant to one’s 
political standing merely when one feels uncomfortable viewing a religious display). 
197 See City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1063 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(“[A] monument which has stood for more than forty years . . . has at least as much civic 
significance as it does religious.”). 
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protected.198  This civic significance can be protected if the history of a 
Ten Commandments monument is treated similarly to the nature of 
government property, so that the reasonable observer is imputed not 
with knowledge of the precise history of the monument but with 
knowledge of the approximate age of the monument.199  Because 
imputing the reasonable observer with knowledge of the forum nature of 
government property protects private speech allowed by the 
government,200 imputing the reasonable observer with knowledge of the 
general history of a Ten Commandments monument would protect the 
monuments that have gained civic significance. 
Already existing stand-alone Ten Commandments displays also 
raise the issue of whether the Endorsement Test can provide consistent 
results.  A major criticism of the Lemon Test was that it yielded 
irreconcilable and inconsistent results,201 and one of Justice O’Connor’s 
goals in developing the Endorsement Test was to provide a test capable 
of consistent application.202  But because the Endorsement Test is so fact-
dependant, meaning that the constitutionality of a Ten Commandments 
monument depends on its placement in relation to the main entrance of a 
municipal building or that the constitutionality of a menorah depends on 
its height in comparison to the height of a Christmas tree, a 
“jurisprudence of minutiae” has and will continue to develop.203   
An example of this jurisprudence of minutiae can be seen in Justice 
Blackmun’s reasoning in Allegheny.204  Justice Blackmun held that the 
eighteen-foot menorah was constitutional because it was located to the 
side of the forty-five foot Christmas tree, which was centered under the 
building’s archway.205  However, by Justice Blackmun’s reasoning, 
another holiday display consisting of a menorah and a Christmas tree 
might be declared unconstitutional if the Christmas tree was only fifteen 
feet taller than the menorah, rather than twenty-seven feet, and if the 
display as a whole, rather than just the Christmas tree, was centered 
                                                 
198 Cf. supra note 89 (explaining that the Third Circuit upheld Jersey City’s practice of 
displaying a crèche and a menorah during the holiday season because it was part of the 
city’s tradition of celebrating diverse cultural events). 
199 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
201 See supra note 29. 
202 See supra notes 52, 58. 
203 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
204 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68. 
205 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68. 
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under the archway.206  A jurisprudence of minutiae has developed when 
one display is declared constitutional and another display 
unconstitutional because of a few feet in height and centering.  
Unfortunately, a jurisprudence of minutiae has already developed in 
cases involving FOE monuments.  Although the FOE monuments are 
exact replicas of each other,207 courts have reached different conclusions 
regarding their constitutionality based upon their location in relation to 
government buildings and other monuments.208  A comparison of the 
locations of the FOE monuments in Books, Van Orden and Freedom from 
Religion Foundation will portray this jurisprudence of minutiae.209  The 
monument in Books, along with two other monuments, was located on 
the twenty-five foot wide front lawn of the municipal building.210  This 
monument was declared unconstitutional.211  The monument in Freedom 
from Religion Foundation was located on the three block Capital Complex 
Grounds along with fifteen other monuments.212  The closest monument 
to the FOE monument was thirty feet away.213  The FOE monument was 
also located adjacent to a sidewalk.214  The monument in Van Orden was 
located on the twenty-two acre Texas State Capital Grounds, along with 
sixteen other monuments.215  These two monuments were declared 
constitutional.216   
These cases can be reconciled on two different grounds.  First, the 
cases can be reconciled by the fact that the Ten Commandments 
monument in Books was in front of the government building, while the 
monuments in Van Orden and Freedom from Religion Foundation were 
located further away from government buildings.217  Second, the cases 
can be reconciled by the fact that the monuments in Van Orden and in 
Freedom from Religion Foundation were one of multiple monuments 
located throughout their respective state capital grounds, while the 
monument in Books was only one of three monuments.218  However, 
                                                 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68. 
207 See supra note 119. 
208 See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra notes 121, 127. 
210 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra note 122. 
213 See supra note 122. 
214 See supra note 122. 
215 See supra note 127. 
216 See supra notes 122, 128 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra notes 121-22, 127 and accompanying text. 
218 See supra notes 121-22, 127 and accompanying text. 
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reconciling these cases on either of these two grounds does not provide 
courts in subsequent Ten Commandments cases with any clear 
standards.    
The problem with the first reconciliation is that “in front” provides 
no clear definition.  Courts could interpret “in front” to mean directly in 
front of the building, closer to the main sidewalk than the government 
building, anywhere but behind the building, or visible to a person 
approaching the front entrance.  In addition, this reconciliation would 
only provide constitutional protection to a majority of people visiting the 
government building—those using the front entrance.  In Freedom from 
Religion Foundation, those people who walk through the State Capital 
Grounds and past the Ten Commandments monument, rather than 
using the main entrance, would receive no constitutional protection 
because they have chosen not to use the most popular method of 
accessing the State Capital.  Constitutional protection should not depend 
on the actions of the majority.219    
The problem with the second reconciliation is that it would require 
courts to come up with a mathematical formula that considers the square 
footage of the government property and the number of monuments.  
Although the lawn in Books contained only three monuments, the lawn 
consisted of a much smaller area than the grounds in either Van Orden or 
in Freedom from Religion Foundation.220  More than likely, a visitor to the 
municipal building in Elkhart, Indiana, would be able to see all three 
monuments at once.221  However, a visitor to the Capital Grounds in 
either Colorado or Texas may only be able to see one or two monuments 
at once.222  Furthermore, requiring courts to determine if government has 
included enough monuments in a certain area does not comport with the 
Supreme Court’s requirement that the surrounding monuments, despite 
the number or their exact location, change the context of the religious 
element.223 
                                                 
219 See supra text accompanying footnote 43 (stating constitutional protection depends on 
the messages conveyed). 
220 See supra notes 121, 127. 
221 See supra note 121 and accompanying text (explaining that the three monuments were 
located on a twenty-five foot lawn). 
222 See supra notes 122, 127 (explaining that in Colorado sixteen monuments were located 
through three square blocks and that in Texas seventeen monuments were located through 
twenty-two acres). 
223 See supra Part III.A. 
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C. The Ten Commandments as Part of a Historical Display After Having Been 
a Stand-Alone Display 
The amount of knowledge that should be imputed to a reasonable 
observer is an issue raised in analyzing a Ten Commandments 
monument that has been integrated into a historical display after 
originally being a stand-alone display.  Throughout her concurring 
opinions, Justice O’Connor has imputed the reasonable observer with 
knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of the challenged government 
action.224  The holdings of lower courts have shown that imputing the 
reasonable observer with the knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of 
the government action generally permits the government to publicly 
acknowledge religion.225   
However, one argument against imputing the reasonable observer 
with knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of the display is that it 
precludes the government from modifying any display.226  The argument 
asserts that the reasonable observer, once aware of the unconstitutional 
display, would conclude that government intended to convey the same 
religious message despite the secular additions.227  In fact, the court in 
McCreary County relied on this proposition and held that the county’s 
“Foundations of American Law” display was unconstitutional because a 
reasonable observer would know that the county had erected the 
historical display only after the fear of litigation arose.228  This argument 
against imputing too much knowledge to the reasonable observer, 
although thought-provoking, is weakened after considering that the 
Supreme Court has provided so few standards relating to Ten 
Commandments displays.229  Requiring government to erect a 
                                                 
224 See supra note 48. 
225 See Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (imputing 
knowledge that the government land is a public forum allowed the Ku Klux Klan to 
display its crosses); Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2000) (imputing 
knowledge that the “Friendship Bell” was to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the 
nuclear attacks on Japan allowed the city to erect a bell resembling a bell found in Buddhist 
temples); ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1999) (imputing knowledge of the city’s 
past celebrations of different religious events allowed the city to erect a holiday display); 
Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997) (imputing knowledge of the city’s 
other holiday decorations allowed the city to erect a crèche).  But see Glassroth v. Moore, 
335 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (imputing knowledge of the Chief Justice’s earlier campaigns 
prohibited the Chief Justice from erecting a Ten Commandments monument). 
226 Acri, supra note 89, at 198. 
227 Id. 
228 See supra text accompanying note 163. 
229 See supra note 102 (explaining that the Supreme Court has only ruled on one case 
concerning the Ten Commandments). 
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constitutional display of the Ten Commandments the first time, when 
government has few standards to use as guidelines and when courts 
have issued inconsistent decisions, is an unrelenting and demanding 
burden to place on government.230  
Nonetheless, the underlying aspect of this argument is whether the 
reasonable person should be an informed observer or whether the 
reasonable observer can be an unknowledgeable passerby; this is the 
exact point that Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor disagreed on in 
Pinette.231  Justice Stevens stated that the reasonable observer should not 
be required to know the general history of a display because this would  
prohibit those without that knowledge, such as schoolchildren, traveling 
salesmen, and tourists, from being protected against government 
endorsement of religion.232  However, Justice O’Connor argued that 
allowing anybody to be the reasonable person would prohibit all 
government acknowledgement of religion because there would always 
be someone who would infer endorsement.233 
Adopting Justice Stevens’ definition of the reasonable observer 
would allow anybody not aware of the history of the challenged display 
to invalidate a government practice that only indirectly and remotely 
benefits religion.  If this definition were adopted, a traveling salesman, 
without knowing the history of Oak Ridge or the “Friendship Bell,” 
could infer that Oak Ridge was endorsing Buddhism by displaying the 
bell,234 or an electrician touring through the Borough of Tenafly, without 
knowing that the borough does not strictly enforce its ordinance, could 
infer that the borough was advocating Judaism by allowing Jews to hang 
lechis on telephone poles.235  The effect of allowing any passerby to 
invalidate a government practice would, for all practical purposes, 
prohibit government from making any acknowledgement of God, and 
this is something that the Supreme Court has never interpreted the 
Constitution as requiring.236  By imputing the reasonable observer with 
knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of a display, courts rightfully 
prohibit anybody from invalidating a government practice unless they 
know the history of the display.      
                                                 
230 Initial Brief of Appellants at 45, ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 
2003) (No. 01-5935). 
231 See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text. 
232 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra note 73. 
234 See supra note 94. 
235 See supra note 92. 
236 See supra note 20. 
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D. The Ten Commandments as a New Stand-Alone Display 
Pursuant to the holdings in Lynch and Allegheny,237 courts are going 
to have a very difficult time finding newly erected stand-alone displays 
of the Ten Commandments on government property constitutional.  
First, unlike the context of the menorah in Allegheny,238 nothing in the 
generic context of a new stand-alone display negates the religious nature 
of the Ten Commandments.239  In addition, unlike stand-alone displays 
that have existed for several decades, new stand-alone displays do not 
have history as part of their context.240  Second, unlike the crèche in 
Lynch,241 a public Ten Commandments monument is not located on 
private property; rather, it is located at a courthouse, in a courtroom, or 
on capital grounds, which are properties that are likely to be known by 
almost all as government-owned.242 
Furthermore, one can argue that a new stand-alone Ten 
Commandments display is more religious than a stand-alone crèche, 
such as the one in Allegheny.243  A person with no knowledge of either a 
crèche or the Ten Commandments receives two different messages when 
viewing them.  When viewing the crèche, this person would see a father 
and a mother, along with shepherds and animals, gazing at a newborn 
baby.244  The crèche itself, without any context, does not yield a religious 
message.  On the other hand, the Ten Commandments clearly yield a 
religious message; the first line on FOE monuments reads, “ THE TEN 
COMMANDMENTS—I AM the LORD thy God.”245  A person with no 
knowledge of the Ten Commandments would conclude that the Ten 
Commandments play an integral role to the religions that worship God.  
Against this backdrop, one could almost conclude that it would be 
impossible for a court to declare a new stand-alone display 
constitutional. 
                                                 
237 See supra notes 33-48, 55-70 and accompanying text. 
238 See supra text accompanying note 56. 
239 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
240 See supra Part IV.B. 
241 See supra note 34. 
242 Cf. supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining that both Justice O’Connor and 
Justice Kennedy agreed that the reasonable observer would know that Capital Square was 
government property). 
243 See supra text accompanying notes 59-64. 
244 See supra note 34. 
245 City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1059 (2001).  Justice Stevens wrote, “The 
graphic emphasis placed on those first lines is rather hard to square with the proposition 
that the monument expresses no particular religious preference.”  Id. 
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However, the Ten Commandments are different than a crèche or a 
menorah, despite all three never having lost their religious nature.246  
Unlike a crèche or a menorah, the Ten Commandments played a role in 
establishing American law.  Present day courts admit that the last six 
commandments—honor your parents, do not kill, do not commit 
adultery, do not steal, do not give false testimony, and do not covet—are 
moral laws.247  However, historians have also traced the first four 
commandments—no other gods, no graven images, do not swear, and 
honor the Sabbath—as having been incorporated into American law.248   
First, the colonies incorporated the first four commandments into 
their respective laws.249  For example, in 1680, New Hampshire 
prohibited any man from openly worshipping or having another god.250  
In 1610, Virginia prohibited any man from impiously or maliciously 
speaking against the Trinity and stated that any man who blasphemes 
the name of God will be put to death.251  In 1682, Pennsylvania required 
that all business be deferred from the Lord’s Day to the next day, unless 
an emergency arose.252 
Second, the Founding Fathers believed that the Ten Commandments 
were a sum of the law.253  John Quincy Adams, the fifth United States 
president, wrote: 
The law given from Sinai was a civil and municipal as 
well as a moral and religious code . . . laws essential to 
the existence of men in society and most of which have 
been enacted by every nation which ever professed any 
                                                 
246 See supra notes 34, 56, 105. 
247 See supra note 105. 
248 See Initial Brief of Appellants at 9, ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 
2003) (No. 01-5935); Affidavit of David Barton in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt, or, in the Alternative, for Supplemental Preliminary 
Injunction, ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (No. 99-507), 
http://www.lc.org/hotissues/attachments/Affidavit%20-%20David%20Barton%20re%20 
impact%20of%20ten%20commandments-%20McCreary.pdf. 
249 See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text. 
250 GENERAL LAW AND LIBERTIES OF NEW HAMPSHIRE (1680), reprinted in COLONIAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:  A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 6 (Donald S. Lutz 
ed., 1998). 
251 ARTICLES, LAWS, AND ORDERS, DIVINE, POLITIC, AND MARTIAL FOR THE COLONY IN 
VIRGINIA (1610-1611), reprinted in COLONIAL ORIGINS, supra note 250, at 316. 
252 CHARTER OF LIBERTIES AND FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA IN AMERICA (1682), reprinted in COLONIAL ORIGINS, supra note 250, at 281. 
253 DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT:  THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION 173 
(2d ed. 1997). 
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code of laws.  Vain indeed would be the search among 
the writings of profane antiquity [secular history] . . . to 
find so broad, so complete and so solid a basis for 
morality as this decalogue [Ten Commandments] lays 
down.254 
William Findley, a soldier in the Revolutionary War and a U.S. 
Congressman stated, “[I]t pleased God to deliver, on Mount Sinai, a 
compendium of this holy law and to write it with His own hand on 
durable tables of stone.  This law, which is commonly called the Ten 
Commandments or Decalogue . . . was incorporated in the judicial 
law.”255  Finally, John Weatherspoon, a signer of the Declaration of 
Independence stated, “[T]he Ten Commandments  . . . are the sum of the 
moral law.”256 
Next, the third commandment continued to appear in court 
decisions in the twentieth century.  In 1921, the Maine Supreme Court 
held that crime of blasphemy can be committed by using “reproachful 
language” against God.257  In 1944, the Florida Supreme Court stated that 
profanity means “words denoting ‘irreverence of God and holy 
things.’”258  In addition, the fourth commandment continues to play a 
role in governing society.  The Supreme Court declared in 1961 that 
Sunday closing laws are constitutional.259  The Constitution excludes 
Sundays from the ten days in which the President has to sign a bill 
passed by Congress.260  Various states have enacted laws restricting the 
sale of alcohol on Sunday.261 
Although these examples prove that all ten of the commandments 
were incorporated into American law at some time, it is unlikely that any 
court will impute knowledge of these specific quotes, court holdings, or 
statutes to the reasonable observer.262  Indeed, a court that is unwilling to 
                                                 
254 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LETTERS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS TO HIS SON ON THE BIBLE AND 
ITS TEACHINGS 61, 70-71 (1850), quoted in BARTON, supra note 253, at 172. 
255 WILLIAM FINDLEY, OBSERVATIONS ON “THE TWO SONS OF OIL” 22-23 (1812), quoted in 
BARTON, supra note 253, at 173. 
256 JOHN WEATHERSPOON, WORKS 95 (1815), quoted in BARTON, supra note 253, at 173. 
257 State v. Mockus, 113 A. 39, 42 (Me. 1921). 
258 Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1944). 
259 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
260 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
261 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-3-1-14 (West Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
123.49(2)(b) (West Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.16.080 (West 2001). 
262 See Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 268 n.12 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“[I]ndeed, the assumption . . . that the reasonable observer knows about . . . statements 
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make the reasonable observer aware of the connection between the Ten 
Commandments and the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, 
the Bill of Rights, and the Mayflower Compact,263 is not going to allow 
the reasonable observer to have knowledge of quotes said over two 
hundred years ago.   
However, the reasonable person standard can be applied in such a 
way as to make newly erected stand-alone displays constitutional.  To 
start, in cases involving public forums, Justice O’Connor and lower 
courts have not required that the reasonable observer know of specific 
instances of how the land was previously used, only that the land had 
been used in the past by different groups.264  Similarly, a reasonable 
observer would not have to be imputed with knowledge of specific 
quotes by Founding Fathers, specific colonial laws, or specific court 
holdings, but only with the general knowledge that the Ten 
Commandments served as a basis for American law. 
But it must now be analyzed whether this knowledge can be 
imputed to a reasonable observer.  Although courts have not articulated 
specific standards on how to determine the knowledge of the reasonable 
observer,265 a number of principles regarding the knowledge of the 
reasonable observer are apparent from previous cases.  First, a 
reasonable observer does not have infinite knowledge.266  Second, the 
reasonable observer may have more knowledge than the average 
person.267  Third, the reasonable observer takes actions to inform himself 
or herself.268  Based on these principles, it is not ill-fitting to impute the 
reasonable observer with the knowledge that the Ten Commandments 
served as a basis for American law.  By only imputing this general 
knowledge, rather than knowledge of specific laws, quotes, and court 
holdings, the reasonable observer is recognized as not having infinite 
knowledge.  Because every tourist or school child may not have this 
                                                                                                             
made by John Adams or the holdings of state court cases seems highly questionable.”); cf. 
Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2002), aff’d, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th 
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 03-486) (not imputing the 
reasonable observer with knowledge of Judge Moore’s numerous speeches over the past 
two years). 
263 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra notes 76, 93 and accompanying text. 
265 Cf. Choper, Endorsement Test, supra note 29, at 510-21 (arguing the reasonable observer 
standard is decided by what judges think a reasonable observer should know). 
266 See supra notes 94, 140. 
267 See supra note 89. 
268 See supra note 93 (explaining that the reasonable observer follows local politics and 
reads the newspaper). 
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general knowledge, the reasonable observer is recognized as having 
more knowledge than the average person.  Furthermore, this general 
knowledge is not greater than other knowledge imputed to the 
reasonable observer by lower courts, such as detailed knowledge of the 
New Testament,269 knowledge of the significance of lechis for Orthodox 
Jews,270 and knowledge of the general history of a county.271 
Even if the knowledge that the Ten Commandments served as a 
basis for American law is imputed to the reasonable observer, it also 
must be analyzed how the reasonable observer will treat this knowledge 
when viewing a newly erected stand-alone Ten Commandments 
monument.272  Foremost to this analysis is the monument’s location on 
government property.273  Not surprisingly, Supreme Court Justices have 
disagreed on how the location of a Ten Commandments monument on 
government property will affect a reasonable observer.274  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist argued that displaying the Ten Commandments outside a 
municipal building “emphasizes the foundational role of the Ten 
Commandments in secular, legal matters.”275  Justice Stevens 
disagreed.276  He not only advocated for a per se rule that a display with 
religious features on government property was an implicit endorsement 
by government,277 he also stated that it is hard to square the idea that 
government is not endorsing religion when the Ten Commandments 
begin with such a religious statement.278 
The opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens illustrate 
the opposing messages a person may receive when viewing a Ten 
Commandments monument on government property, and lower courts 
have aligned themselves with both Justices.279  The problem with 
analyzing how a reasonable person would react to a Ten 
Commandments monument on government property, it is argued, is that 
persons of different religious persuasions differ on what is reasonable.280  
                                                 
269 See supra note 89. 
270 See supra text accompanying note 92. 
271 See supra text accompanying note 135. 
272 See supra note 122. 
273 Cf. supra text accompanying note 80. 
274 See City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058 (2001). 
275 Id. at 1062 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
276 Id. at 1058. 
277 See supra text accompanying note 80. 
278 City of Elkhart, 532 U.S. at 1058. 
279 See supra notes 124, 148, 155, 162 and accompanying text. 
280 See supra note 64 (explaining that reasonable people of different religions are going to 
disagree on what constitutes an endorsement of religion).  Even people of the same religion 
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The criticism of making the relevant perceptions come from a 
“reasonable person” is that “reasonable,” when used in contexts such as 
contracts, torts, and criminal law, standardizes judgment.281  However, 
the reasonable observer standard is not dependent on what one believes 
or on whether one thinks the beliefs of another are reasonable, but 
rather, it is dependent upon how one reacts to government 
acknowledgements of religion,282 and that reaction can be 
standardized.283   
Courts have laid down principles on how a reasonable observer 
reacts to government acknowledgements of religion.  First, a reasonable 
observer is not hostile to religion.284  Second, a reasonable observer uses 
his or her knowledge to provide context to the display.285  Applying 
these two principles, a reasonable observer, knowing that the Ten 
Commandments influenced American law, will understand that 
government is only recognizing one of the influences of American law.  
In addition, because the reasonable observer is not hostile to religion, the 
reasonable observer will not dismiss this secular purpose even if it 
indirectly benefits religion. 
Therefore, under the Endorsement Test, all four types of Ten 
Commandments displays can be constitutional, provided government 
has a permissible secular reason for erecting the display.286  
Unfortunately, many courts have been unwilling to adopt parts of the 
foregoing analysis.287  Because of this unwillingness, this Note will 
                                                                                                             
can differ on what constitutes an endorsement of religion.  Beth Hatcher, Controversy 
Surrounding Display Splits Preachers, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD, Oct. 13, 2003, 
http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/101303/new_20031013013.shtml (last visited Aug. 
4, 2003). 
281 See supra note 64. 
282 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that the Endorsement Test 
focuses on the message actually conveyed by a religious monument to determine how 
viewers react to the display). 
283 Cf. supra notes 76, 91, 93 and accompanying text (explaining that when a reasonable 
observer sees a religious display, the reasonable observer recalls prior events and uses that 
knowledge in determining the purpose of the religious display). 
284 Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 84 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the 
Establishment Clause is not hostile to religion); supra text accompanying notes 39-40, 52 
(explaining that some acknowledgement of religion by government is okay). 
285 See supra note 91 (explaining that a reasonable observer upon seeing a crèche during 
the holiday season would remember seeing the other Christmas decorations throughout 
the city); supra note 93 (explaining that a reasonable observer upon seeing a religious 
display on a public forum would remember the previous displays on the same land). 
286 See supra Part IV.A-D. 
287 See supra notes 120-24, 143-63 and accompanying text. 
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propose a new test to analyze public Ten Commandments displays that 
will provide more objective standards.  These objective standards will 
allow courts to hand down more consistent holdings and recognize the 
civic significance of already existing stand-alone displays and the 
historical significance of the Ten Commandments as a basis of American 
law.  
V.   A PROPOSED TEST 
Numerous problems have resulted from courts applying the 
reasonable observer standard to public displays of the Ten 
Commandments.  By applying this standard, courts have often ignored 
the civic significance of long-standing displays;288 they have reached 
inconsistent results by focusing extensively on the context of the 
display;289 and they have prohibited government from recognizing the 
Ten Commandments as one of the foundations of American law.290  
Despite these problems, all four types of displays can be constitutional.291   
Part V of this Note proposes a new test for courts to use in analyzing 
public Ten Commandments displays.  This proposed test discards the 
reasonable person standard, preventing courts from imputing only the 
necessary knowledge to the reasonable observer to reach the court’s 
desired result.292  Instead, the test proposed by this Note focuses on the 
type of the Ten Commandments display.  Focusing on the type of 
display allows the historical significance of the Ten Commandments and 
the civic significance of certain monuments to be recognized, while still 
allowing the display’s context to remain a determining factor.  Under 
this proposed test, courts will engage in a two-step analysis to determine 
the constitutionality of public Ten Commandments displays.  First, the 
court determines the type of display from one of four choices.293  Second, 
the court engages in the applicable test to determine if the display 
violates the Establishment Clause.294   
                                                 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 120-24. 
289 See supra notes 120-30, 162 and accompanying text; see also supra Part IV.B. 
290 See supra notes 156, 161 and accompanying text; see also supra Part IV.D. 
291 See supra Part IV. 
292 See supra note 54. 
293 See infra Part V.A. 
294 See infra Part V.B. 
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A. The Four Types of Ten Commandments Displays 
Under the proposed test, the first step in analyzing the 
constitutionality of a public Ten Commandments display is for the court 
to identify the display type.  Four different types of Ten Commandments 
displays exist: 
1.  A Newly Erected Stand-Alone Display:  A newly 
erected stand-alone display is a display that contains 
the text of only the Ten Commandments and has not 
gained local civic significance. 
2. An Already Existing Stand-Alone Display:  An 
already existing stand-alone display is a display that 
contains the text of only the Ten Commandments and 
has gained local civic significance.  
3. Originally as Part of a Historical Display:  The Ten 
Commandments are originally part of a historical 
display when the display contains the text of the Ten 
Commandments and other historical legal documents 
and when the first time the disputed Ten 
Commandments display was erected, it was within 
the historical display. 
4. As Part of a Historical Display After Originally 
Being a Stand-Alone Display:  The Ten 
Commandments are part of a historical display after 
originally being a stand-alone display when the 
display contains the text of the Ten Commandments 
and other historical legal documents and when the 
disputed display of the Ten Commandments became 
part of a historical display after it had previously 
been a stand-alone display. 
Requiring courts to first determine the type of display forces them to 
begin with an objective inquiry, instead of a subjective determination, 
into the knowledge of the reasonable observer.  Beginning with an 
objective inquiry should provide for more consistent results.   
Although most Ten Commandments displays can easily be placed 
into one of the four categories, a few clarifications and warnings need to 
be given.  First, while stand-alone displays contain the text of only the 
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Ten Commandments, they may contain engravings and plaques.295  
Second, a historical display may be a single monument with texts of 
various documents engraved on it, a series of framed documents, or a 
series of monuments.296     
This Note further recognizes that because the provided definitions 
offer no guidelines for when a stand-alone display has gained civic 
significance, courts will struggle in determining when a stand-alone 
display has gained local civic significance.  Without a doubt, not all cases 
will be as clear as the FOE displays, many of which stood for thirty to 
forty years without being challenged,297 the plaque on the facade of the 
Chester County courthouse, which stood for eighty years before being 
challenged,298 or, on the other end of the spectrum, Judge Moore’s 
monument, which was surrounded by controversy for the entire two 
years of its existence.299  While this Note recognizes that courts will 
struggle with this issue, it does not want to set an arbitrary time period 
for when a display has gained civic significance because each display 
and community is unique and courts need to consider the characteristics 
of each display and its community.300  However, this Note does provide 
the following factors that courts could use to determine if a display has 
civic significance:  the age of the display, the number of times the display 
has been relocated, the amount of present controversy regarding the 
display, the donor of the display and his or her relationship to the 
community, and any designations labeling the display or its location a 
historical landmark. 
Courts may also struggle defining displays, which contain many 
documents, and therefore, are historical displays by definition but in 
which the Ten Commandments are significantly more prominent than 
any other document.  Supporters of the display will argue that such a 
display is a historical display, while opponents will argue it is a stand-
alone display.301  This Note suggests treating such a display as a 
historical display in order to maintain consistency in defining displays 
                                                 
295 See supra note 119 (describing the various engravings and plaques on the FOE 
monuments). 
296 See supra notes 147, 152, 158 and accompanying text (describing various historical 
displays). 
297 See supra text accompanying notes 121, 127. 
298 See supra text accompanying note 134. 
299 See supra note 1. 
300 Cf. supra Part IV.A (explaining that each display must be analyzed under its unique 
circumstances). 
301 See infra Part V.B. 
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and to prevent courts from recasting displays as a different type to get 
the court’s desired result.  In addition, the proposed test for historical 
displays considers the size of the Ten Commandments in relation to the 
size of the other documents.302 
B. The Proposed Test for Each Type of Display 
After determining the type of display, the courts must then engage 
in the appropriate test.  Because each type of display has a different 
history and a different context, each type of display is afforded its own 
test. 
1. A Newly Erected Stand-Alone Display 
A newly erected stand-alone display contains the text of only the Ten 
Commandments and has not yet gained civic significance.303  The 
proposed test for a newly erected stand-alone display is: 
A newly erected stand-alone display shall be presumed 
unconstitutional unless the government can show that several 
elements in the display, or its context, negate the religious 
nature of the Ten Commandments. 
This proposed test recognizes that newly erected stand-alone 
displays can be constitutional by permitting government to overcome 
the presumption of unconstitutionality.  However, this proposed test 
also recognizes that often nothing in the display or its context negates the 
religious nature of the Ten Commandments.304  Because the display often 
contains nothing to negate the religious nature of the Ten 
Commandments, the presumption is that the display is unconstitutional 
and the burden to prove the display is constitutional is on the 
government.305  The burden on the government only requires it to prove 
that several elements negate the religious nature of the Ten 
Commandments;306 the test does not require government to prove that 
these elements significantly negate the religious nature of the Ten 
Commandments. This is because a Ten Commandments display is a 
                                                 
302 See infra Part V.B.3. 
303 See supra Part V.A; supra note 177. 
304 See supra Part IV.D. 
305 See infra Parts V.B.2-4 (explaining that because the other types of displays have 
contexts which negate the religious nature of the Ten Commandments, the presumption is 
that those displays are constitutional). 
306 See supra note 295 and accompanying text. 
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passive display; any observer can avoid seeing the display by diverting 
his or her eyes.307  Elements which could negate the religious nature of 
the Ten Commandments include:  the display’s location,308 the 
integration of symbols from different religions on the monument,309 and 
a plaque recognizing the donor of the monument and stating the 
purpose in displaying the monument.310 
2. An Already Existing Stand-Alone Display 
An already existing stand-alone display contains the text of only the 
Ten Commandments and has gained local civic significance.311  The 
proposed test for an already existing stand-alone display is: 
An already existing stand-alone display shall be presumed 
constitutional unless it is shown that the religious significance 
of the display significantly outweighs the civic significance. 
By presuming that an already existing display is constitutional, this 
proposed test allows government to recognize the civic significance of 
the display.  The proposed test comports with Justice O’Connor’s 
definition of the reasonable observer in two ways.  First, by presuming 
this display to be constitutional, courts cannot declare the display 
unconstitutional merely because one individual perceives 
endorsement.312  Courts can only declare the display unconstitutional if 
the religious nature of the display substantially outweighs the civic 
nature.  Possible ways to show that the religious nature significantly 
outweighs the civic nature could include showing that the public 
controversy regarding the display has not dissipated since the display 
was erected, or showing that local citizens see the display as a place of 
worship.  Second, by presuming this display to be constitutional, this 
proposed test rejects Justice Stevens’ argument that any display on 
                                                 
307 See supra note 58 (explaining that Justice Kennedy did not see the crèche in Allegheny 
as a violation of the Establishment Clause because it was a passive display and observers 
could divert their eyes to avoid seeing it). 
308 See supra note 122 (explaining that the Colorado Supreme Court found an FOE 
monument constitutional in part because it was in the vicinity of fifteen other monuments). 
309 See supra note 124 (explaining that the Colorado Supreme Court concluded an FOE 
monument symbolized tolerance of other religions because a Star of David and a symbol of 
Christ were inscribed on the monument). 
310 See supra note 119 (explaining that the FOE monuments contained a plaque stating 
that the monument had been donated by the FOE). 
311 See supra Part V.A.; supra note 175. 
312 See supra note 73. 
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government property is a per se violation of the Establishment Clause.313  
By rejecting Justice Stevens’ per se violation argument, government is 
not prohibited from making acknowledgments of religion that provide 
an indirect and remote benefit to religion.314  In addition, by presuming 
this display to be constitutional, the danger of creating a “jurisprudence 
of minutiae” feared by Justice Kennedy is removed.315  Courts no longer 
have to analyze where the monument is located in relation to the center 
of the archway or to the front door of the municipal building.316 
3. Originally as Part of a Historical Display 
The Ten Commandments are originally part of a historical display 
when the display contains the text of other historical legal documents 
and when the first time the Ten Commandments were erected, they were 
part of the historical display.317  The proposed test for a Ten 
Commandments monument originally part of a historical display is: 
A Ten Commandments monument originally part of a 
historical display shall be presumed constitutional unless it 
can be shown that the government lacked any intent to display 
the Ten Commandments as a historical document. 
By presuming that a historical display is constitutional, this 
proposed test allows government to recognize the historical significance 
of the Ten Commandments without first determining if a reasonable 
observer would be able to establish a historical connection between the 
documents.318  But by allowing the display to be declared 
unconstitutional if the opponents can prove that government had no 
intent to display the Ten Commandments as a historical document, this 
proposed test does not let government hide behind an impermissible 
purpose. 
This proposed test is consistent with the Supreme Court’s analyses 
in Lynch and Allegheny, in which the Court paid close attention to the 
context of the holiday displays.319  Historical displays are granted a 
                                                 
313 See supra text accompanying note 80. 
314 See supra text accompanying notes 39-41, 52. 
315 See supra note 58; see also Part IV.B (demonstrating how a “jurisprudence of minutiae” 
has been created with the reasonable person standard). 
316 See supra Part IV.B. 
317 See supra Part V.A; supra note 174. 
318 See supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text. 
319 See supra text accompanying notes 33-48, 55-70. 
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presumption of constitutionality because the context of the Ten 
Commandments—surrounded by historical legal documents—negates 
the religious nature of the Ten Commandments.320  In addition, by 
presuming that the other historical legal documents have negated the 
religious nature of the Ten Commandments, a court is prevented from 
declaring a historical display unconstitutional merely because it believes 
that government did not include the necessary documents.321  The 
context of the display, however, may also be strong evidence to support 
the opponent’s argument that government acted with no intention to 
display the Ten Commandments as a historical document.  For example, 
the opponents of the display could prove that government had no 
intention to acknowledge the historical value of the Ten Commandments 
by showing that the Ten Commandments are double the size of any 
other document. 
4. As Part of a Historical Display After Originally Being a Stand-Alone 
Display 
The Ten Commandments are part of a historical display after 
originally being a stand-alone display when the Ten Commandments 
display was first erected as a stand-alone display and then became part 
of a historical display.322  The proposed test for a Ten Commandments 
display that is part of a historical display after originally being a stand-
alone display is: 
A Ten Commandments display that is part of a historical 
display after originally being a stand-alone display shall be 
presumed constitutional unless it can be shown that the 
context of the historical display has not significantly negated 
the religious nature of the Ten Commandments. 
This proposed test provides a presumption of constitutionality for 
these displays to maintain consistency with all historical displays; in 
appearance there are no differences between historical displays when the 
Ten Commandments were originally part of the display and when they 
were not.  Furthermore, this proposed test still comports with the 
holdings in Lynch and Allegheny declaring that the context of the display 
is determinative.323  Although the Ten Commandments were originally 
                                                 
320 See supra note 161. 
321 See supra Part IV.A. 
322 See supra Part V.A.; supra note 176. 
323 See supra text accompanying notes 33-48, 55-70. 
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displayed as a religious document, the new context negates the religious 
nature of the Ten Commandments by surrounding them with historical 
legal documents.   
However, because government may have acted with an 
impermissible purpose in erecting the first display of the Ten 
Commandments, thereby including the display’s history in the context of 
the historical display, government must put the Ten Commandments in 
a context that will significantly negate the religious nature of the Ten 
Commandments and erase any reminders that the Ten Commandments 
once stood as a stand-alone display.  To do this, government may have to 
change the location of the Ten Commandments monument rather than 
erect the other monuments at the location of the original Ten 
Commandments display, or reframe the Ten Commandments to match 
the other framed documents. 
Although the test proposed by this Note discards the reasonable 
person standard in analyzing each of the four types of public Ten 
Commandments displays, it retains the emphasis from Lynch and 
Allegheny that each display be analyzed within its context.324  This new 
test proposes to begin the analysis of the display’s context by starting 
with the type of the display, rather than with the knowledge of the 
reasonable observer.325  By switching the focus to the type of display, 
courts will begin their analysis from an objective standpoint.  The result 
will be that courts will hand down consistent opinions and that the 
historical significance of the Ten Commandments and the civic 
significance of long-standing displays will be recognized. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
In determining the constitutionality of religious displays, either 
crèches, menorahs, or the Ten Commandments, the Supreme Court has 
stated that the context of the display is determinative.  Currently, the 
context of the display is determined by the perceptions of the reasonable 
observer, and because the reasonable observer is a hypothetical 
construct, it must be imputed with knowledge.  Supreme Court Justices 
have disagreed on the knowledge of the reasonable observer; and 
therefore, lower courts often impute the reasonable observer with 
varying levels of knowledge.  The result is that courts hand down 
inconsistent decisions and that the historical significance of the Ten 
                                                 
324 See supra Parts V.B.1-4. 
325 See supra Part V.A. 
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Commandments and the civic significance of already existing stand-
alone displays are not recognized. 
This Note proposes a new test in analyzing Ten Commandments 
displays.  Like the reasonable observer standard, this proposed test 
focuses on the context of the display; it looks at such factors as the age of 
the display, the location of the display, and the documents in the display.  
However, the starting point for this proposed test is the type of display.  
By focusing on the type of display, courts are starting with the same 
question and the same four types of displays to choose from; courts are 
no longer starting with many different reasonable observers who have 
varying degrees of knowledge.  This will lead to more consistent 
holdings.  In addition, focusing on the type of display will allow long-
standing displays and historical displays to be declared constitutional 
because the proposed test recognizes that, although inherently religious, 
certain Ten Commandments displays have civic and historical value. 
Julie Van Groningen* 
                                                 
*  I dedicate this Note to my parents, Jerry and Sheri Van Groningen.  I have been 
blessed by their daily love and encouragement and by their faithful service to the Giver of 
the Ten Commandments. 
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